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In the last two decades economies of the former communist countries experienced two 
important historical events. After the fall of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
former communist countries went through the transition process with the objective of turning 
their socialist centrally planned economies based on state ownership into a market-driven 
system with private ownership of production resources. The second event was the accession 
of Central and East European Countries (CEECs) to the European Union (EU). This process 
led to a further strengthening of market institutions in CEECs and at the same time led to the 
introduction of EU polices in New Eastern EU Member States (NEMS).   
  The agricultural sector played a prominent role in these two historical events. In terms 
of agricultural production and agricultural employment, the agricultural sector in many 
transition countries is more important than in Western Europe and North America. 
Agriculture is therefore viewed as a much more important factor for economic growth. 
Consequently transition within the agricultural sector significantly affected the overall 
economy as well as living standards of a large share of the region’s population. These factors 
also significantly affected EU accession negotiations. Agriculture represented one of the most 
difficult issues in the negotiations over enlargement. This was further complicated by the fact 
that agriculture was, and continues today to absorb almost half of the EU budget. There were 





significant changes in the EU’s budgetary expenditure and have large market implications.   
  There is a growing literature on agricultural transition and agricultural accession. An 
important issue analyzed in the transition literature is the impact of land reform and 
privatization on the development of farm structures. Initially, the literature predicted that 
large socialist cooperative farms would give way to individual farms, and farm structures in 
transition countries would converge to the farm types observed in Western Europe, USA or in 
other developed countries. However, later literature acknowledged that many institutional 
impediments which reforms failed to remove helped to preserve features of the farm structure 
inherited from Communism. Large farms still dominate in many transition countries. In 
general the evidence shows that the reforms and the emergence of individual farms had a 
positive impact on agricultural productivity. At the same time, the empirical evidence on the 
relative efficiency of individual farms and large commercial farms is inconclusive. 
  The main issues analyzed in the accession literature was production, trade, budgetary 
and income effects of the EU accession of CEECs. The evidence is mixed, but in general 
(especially early) literature predicted large market effects and large budgetary costs of 
accession. The literature predicted a large increase in production, trade, agricultural support 
and incomes after accession of CEECs. These effects were in most cases predicted to be 
driven by the introduction of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of EU in NEMS.  
  The objective of this study is to improve our understanding of income distribution 
effects of polices in general and also applied to the case of CEECs’ EU accession and 
subsequent adoption of CAP. In the same time the objective is to understand the welfare 
effects of land reforms in transition countries. The contribution of this study to the literature 
is the incorporation of land market and credit market imperfections into the analysis on 
welfare effects of polices and of land reforms implemented during transition. 





distribution effects of subsidies and of land reforms implemented during transition. In 
particular, this study focuses on: (i) the modeling of transaction costs and imperfect 
competition and their impact on land markets in transition countries; (ii) the analysis of how 
land market imperfections and credit market imperfections affect welfare effects of area 
subsidies; and (iii) the efficiency and welfare effects of reforms in the land markets in 
transition countries. 
  In the first chapter of this thesis, a partial equilibrium model of the land market is 
developed to analyze how transaction costs and imperfect competition affect land markets in 
CEECs. The chapter shows that the combination of imperfect competition and transaction 
costs have substantial impact on the functioning of land markets in transition countries. 
Markets imperfections result in depressed land market rents and provide an advantage to 
large corporate farms by creating extra benefits to them. Landowners lose because of low 
land rental price. Individual farms may gain or loose from market imperfections. They gain 
from imperfect competition, while they loose from transaction costs.  
  The second chapter of this thesis uses the model developed in the first chapter to 
analyze the income and efficiency effects of the implementation of CAP subsidies in CEECs. 
Eastern enlargement of the EU led to integration of the agricultural economies of the NEMS 
in the CAP.  As a consequence, farmers in the NEMS receive area payments for the land they 
use, gradually increasing over a transition period. In well-functioning land markets, such 
payments typically get incorporated in land values and thereby benefit mainly landowners 
and lead to increases in input costs for farmers. The second chapter shows that, as long as 
there is competition from individual farms, domination of the land market by corporate farms 
and transaction costs do not affect the result that CAP subsidies will end up as increases in 
land prices and benefit landowners instead of farmers. In the last part of the chapter, it is 





While distortions are reduced and policy rents are shifted to farmers, restructuring of the 
farms is blocked. Mitigating this effect through reserve entitlements causes a reduction in 
subsidy benefits for farmers as land prices increase.   
  The third chapter departs to some extent from the second chapter by using a general 
model of agriculture to analyze distributional effects of area payments. The model introduces 
credit market imperfections. The aim is to analyze how credit market imperfections alter the 
results obtained in chapter two. The chapter shows that imperfections in credit markets may 
lead to very different outcomes.  When farms are credit constrained, the introduction of area 
payments will lead to even larger gains for landowners as land rents will increase by more 
than the subsidy.  The effect of an area payment on farm surplus is negative as farmers gain 
directly from the subsidy and indirectly from the increase in productivity. However, they lose 
from the increase in land rents. The land rent increase is larger than their gains, causing a 
negative net impact.  If farms are heterogeneous, the most credit constrained farms (ex ante) 
and those which are most effective in using the subsidies for the reduction of their credit 
constraints may gain. 
The forth chapter of this thesis analyzes the efficiency and welfare effects of partial 
reforms which reduce transaction costs but which maintain imperfect competition in the land 
market. In several transition countries large corporate farms continue to dominate the land 
market. For example, they use more than 80% of land in countries such as Belarus, Slovakia, 
and Russia and more than 50 % in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. 
This chapter shows that the efficiency gains from transaction cost reductions are mitigated, 







CHAPTER 1.   A Model of Transaction Costs and 





1.1. Introduction  
 
In 1989 the Berlin wall, a symbol of Communism, fell, leading to the collapse of Communist 
regimes in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). During the subsequent 
transition period, the CEECs turned their socialist, centrally planned economies based on 
state ownership into market-driven system with private ownership of production resources.  
The structure of socialist agriculture was strongly biased towards extremely large 
farms. Average farm size ranged from around 1 200 hectares in Poland to around 19 000 
hectares in Bulgaria. This size was very large compared to average farm size in market 
economies such as the European Union or USA. 
Through the privatization process private property rights to land were restored. In 
most CEECs land was restituted to former owners. Hungary and Romania combined the 
distribution of land to agricultural workers with the restitution to former owners (Lerman, 
Csaki, and Feder, 2004; Swinnen, 1999) 
The land reform process has created a class of new, sometimes absentee, land owners 




These corporate farms are mostly successor organizations from the former collective and 
state farms after farm privatization and land reform.  In CEECs they are, on average, between 
300 and 1200 hectares, and their share of land use is around 90% in Slovakia, 75% in the 
Czech Republic, 50% in Bulgaria, 40% in Hungary, and more than 30% in Romania and 
Estonia.
2  Moreover, in most countries they use a more than proportionate share of the best 
agricultural areas of the country.   
Large scale corporate farms continue to use large parts of the land due to a variety of 
reasons. However, an important reason is that historically, the large-scale farms were the 
users of the land. New owners of the land face significant transaction costs if they want to 
withdraw their land from the farms and reallocate it. Transaction costs include bargaining 
with the farm management, obtaining information on land and tenure regulations, 
implementing the delineation of the land and dealing with inheritance and co-owners (Mathijs 
and Swinnen, 1998; Prosterman and Rolfes, 1999; Ciaian, 2001).  
The domination of large corporate farms also leads to imperfect competition in the 
land market. The combination of imperfect competition and transaction costs has a strong 
impact on land prices. For example, Vranken and Swinnen (2003) find that in Hungary land 
prices are lower in regions where corporate farms dominate. In several CEECs there is a large 
gap in rental prices between land used by corporate farms and land used by individual farms.  
Table 1.2 shows how in the Czech Republic and Slovakia land rents paid by corporate farms 
are generally much lower: most vary between 60% and 20% of the rents paid by family 
farms.  Further, corporate farms also reduce payments by paying in kind instead of in cash.  A 
study by IME (2000) found that in Bulgaria, corporate farms generally paid their rents in 
kind, while family farms were much more likely to pay cash or mixed cash/in-kind.  
The objective of this chapter is to develop a partial equilibrium model of the land 
                                                                                                                                                        




market of transition countries to analyze how transaction costs and imperfect competition 
affect the development of land markets in CEECs. This model will be used in chapters two to 
analyze the income and efficiency effects of the implementation of CAP area subsidies in 
CEECs, and in chapter four to analyze the efficiency and welfare effects of reforms. 
The analysis in this chapter is related to the literature on transaction costs which can 
be traced back to Coase (1937) who applied it to the theory of firm. After Coase, Oliver 
Williamson was the key contributor to the development of transaction cost economics. 
Williamson focused on the problem of vertical integration and combined the organization 
theory approach with the economic theory of the firm. According to Williamson, the key 
determinants of transaction costs are frequency, specificity, uncertainty, limited rationality, 
and opportunistic behavior. Williamson defines transaction costs as the work that individuals 
or organizations have to put in terms of effort, time and various expenses in order to obtain 
relevant information with which negotiate contracts, to the process of bargaining and 
enforcement of contracts (Williamson, 1985). Transaction cost economics was used to study 
a variety of economic phenomena such as transaction cost of market exchange (e.g. Baumol, 
1952; Tobin, 1956; Demsetz, 1968), governance structure dealing with various ways of 
organizing transactions (e.g. Williamson e.g., 1967, 1971, 1973, and 1975), and the 
measurement and agency problem (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Barzel, 1982). 
There are many applications of transaction cost theory to agricultural land markets. 
The most important fields can be grouped into three categories: namely (i) agency problems 
associated with labor, credit and insurance market imperfections (e.g. Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig, 1986; Barham, Bouncer, and Carter, 1996; Allen and Lueck, 1998; Deininger 
and Feder, 1998), (ii) rental contract choice focusing on transaction cost economics of 
                                                                                                                                                        




sharecropping, fixed wage and fixed rent contracts (e.g. Cheung, 1969; Eswaran and Kotwal, 
1985; Taslim, 1992; Barzel, 1997; Ray, 1999; Swinnen and Vranken, 2004), and (iii) formal 
and informal institutions such as land property rights, land reform, land law, norms, etc. (e.g. 
Deininger, 1999; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1989; Prosterman and Rolfes, 1999; Swinnen, 
1999; Platteau, 2000). This thesis is closely related to the third group of studies particularly 
focusing on transaction costs associated with land reforms implemented in transition 
countries. 
 
1.2. The Model 
 
Before transition, effective land rights in CEECs were in the hands of the state, or the 
collective farms.  Land was used by large-scale state and collective farms.
3 Land reform in 
the early 1990s reallocated most land property rights to individual households in CEECs.  We 
will refer to them as “landowners”.  Land reform took several forms.  The main form in 
CEECs was restitution of land to former owners (Lerman, 2001; Swinnen, 1999; Ciaian and 
Pokrivcak 2007).   
  More or less simultaneous with land reform, important farm restructuring took place.  
Farm restructuring included a privatization of the farms and a restructuring of the 
management structure. This restructuring included a reorganization of collective and state 
farms into private cooperatives and farming companies.  We will refer to them as “corporate 
farms”, which are typically large-scale. The most dramatic restructuring was the break-up of 
collective and state farms into household plots and family farms. We will refer to these as 
“individual farms”.   
  To keep the analysis tractable we will model these developments in a stylized way.  
                                                 
3 The exceptions to this rule were Poland and the countries of former Yugoslavia, where land use and ownership 




First, consider a situation where all the land is now owned by individual households, but still 
used by the corporate farms.  (This reflects a situation where the land reform is formally 
completed, and the farms have been privatized, but no restructuring to individual farms has 
occurred.)   
  Second, we assume that land transactions take place exclusively through rental 
agreements.  This is consistent with the majority of land transactions in CEECs (Research 
Institute of Agricultural Economics; Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic; Swinnen and 
Vranken, 2004; VUZE, 2001).  Including both sales and rental transactions would seriously 
complicate the analysis without yielding much additional insights for most of the analysis.  
Landowners receive a rent r for each unit of land that they rent to corporate farms.   
  Several households, landowners or not, consider starting up an individual farm for 
which they need land.  They can either withdraw land from corporate farms or rent from 
landowners who currently rent their land to corporate farms.  In both cases the price they 
have to pay per unit of land is the sum of the rent paid by the corporate farms, r, (explicitly 
for rented land or implicitly as opportunity costs) and the transaction costs, t, involved in 
withdrawing the land from the corporate farms.   
 
1.3. Transaction Costs 
 
Transaction costs in land exchange can be very substantial in CEECs.
4  When a landowner 
wants to withdraw land from the CF there are several reasons why transaction costs may arise 
in this process. These include: bargaining costs, costs of enforcing right of withdrawal, and 
costs related to asymmetric information, co-ownership, unclear boundary definition and costs 
                                                 
4 This thesis focuses on land transaction costs resulted from farm collectivisation during Communism and 
subsequent land reforms implemented during transition period. As a result, the analyses apply only to countries 
where collectivisation took place. In countries such as Poland collectivization took place only in some regions 
and thus the analysis concerns only these regions.  




related to unknown owners.  First, while the withdrawal procedure is usually stipulated by 
law, it is also determined by the willingness of the CF to implement it (Mathijs and Swinnen, 
1998). For example, in Slovakia the CF has the right to give a plot of land to owners located 
in a different place than the one specified in the ownership title (based on former boundaries) 
if the plot affects the integrity of the CF's land operation. The landowner gets only usage right 
to this new plot while s/he keeps the ownership right to the original plot located in former 
boundaries. This asymmetry obviously increases the costs for the landowner, since s/he can 
be deterred from withdrawal by being offered a plot located far from his operation or the plot 
may be of lower soil quality. The laws in Bulgaria, Slovenia and Hungary contained similar 
transaction cost increasing features (see Bojnec and Swinnen, 1997; Ciaian, 2001; Mathijs, 
1997; Prosterman and Rolfes, 1999; Swain, 1999).   
Second, CF managers typically have more information than landowners about the 
economic situation of farm and about regulations governing local land transactions.
5 This is 
especially the case for landowners who have not been involved in agriculture, or are living 
outside the village where their land is located, or are pensioners (Swain, 1999).
6  
  Third, other transaction costs follow from co-ownership of land, unclear boundary 
definition, and the problem of unknown owners. In many CEECs, land was never formally 
nationalized during the Communist regime, although effective property rights on land were 
controlled by the regime and the collective farms.  Hence, legal ownership of land remained 
private (Swinnen, 1999). However, land ownership registrations were poorly maintained, if at 
all, and in many areas land consolidation was implemented, wiping out old boundaries and 
relocating natural identification points (such as old roads and small rivers).  The loss of 
                                                 
5 For example, Swain (1999) describes how pensioner-members of co-operatives in Slovakia were “forced” to 
rent the land to the co-operative by being threatened of losing their pension. 
 
6 In Hungary "passive owners" (this include village-based pensioners, landowners that are not active in the co-
operatives and those living outside of the village where their land is located) received around 71% of 




information on registration and boundaries produced a large number of unknown owners in 
some transition countries (Dale and Baldwin 1999). In addition, unsettled land inheritance 
within families during the socialist regime caused a strong land ownership fragmentation and 
a large number of co-owners per a plot of land. For example, according to OECD (1997), in 
1993 approximately 9.6 million plots were registered in Slovakia, which is 0.45 hectares per 
plot, and each plot was owned by on average 12 to 15 people. As Dale and Baldwin (1999) 
put it, “a single field of twenty hectares may have hundreds of co-owners”. In the Czech 
Republic, there were 4 million ownership papers registered in 1998 for 13 million parcels, 
with an average parcel size of 0.4 hectares. In Bulgaria, a recent study found that 50% of the 
plots were co-owned, often by several people (Vranken, Noev, and Swinnen, 2004).  The 
average number of co-owners was more than two (excluding husband and wife co-
ownership).  Some co-owners may be unknown, or may not be in the country, or may be 
scattered all over the country.  This raises the costs of land withdrawal as land withdrawal 
from the CF normally requires agreement from co-owners. The study indeed finds that co-
owned plots of land in Bulgaria are more likely to be used by corporate farms.  
Finally, other costs related to land transfers include notary fees, taxes and other 
administrative charges. For instance, the studies on Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania, 
estimate these costs between 10% and 30% of the value of the land transaction (OECD, 2000; 
Prosterman and Rolfes, 1999).  
To model these transaction costs, we need to distinguish between transaction costs 
which are specific to the plot, to the owner, and to the user.  Transaction costs will depend on 
the distribution of land among households and farms, on individual characteristics of 




that initially all plots of one owner are used by one corporate farm.
7  Define G
j as the 
transaction costs specific to the relationship between owner j and the corporate farm. These 
costs can be due to asymmetric information and bargaining. Define as the g
ij transaction costs 
specific to plot i of owner j. Transaction costs may differ per plot due to the number of co-
owners or boundary uncertainty.   
We can now derive the transaction costs per unit of land, t
ij, as a function of these 











t + =  
where and 
ij a  and 
j A  are, respectively, the size of plot i and total land owned by owner j 
with  ∑ =
i
ij j a A .  
First, it follows from (1) that fragmentation of land ownership increases the per unit 
transaction costs. This is reflected in the first term of equation (1). Ceteris paribus, with 
fragmentation the plot size will be smaller and hence the transaction costs per plot higher. 
This increases transaction costs per unit of land:  0 < ∂ ∂
ij ij a t  with 
j A   fixed.
8 
  Second, when land ownership is distributed unequally among households, transaction 
costs increase with the amount of land withdrawn from corporate farms.  The reason is that 
part of the transaction costs 
j G  are fixed per owner.  Hence, ceteris paribus, larger owners 
will have lower per unit land transaction costs, and will be withdrawing land first.  Smaller 
                                                 
7 This assumption is realistic giving the regional organization of the CFs and also consistent with the further 
modeling approach using one representative CF. 
 
8 Note that we assumed that  0 = ∂ ∂






















 and the 
sign of 
ij ij a t ∂ ∂  depends on the sign an the size of 
ij ij a g ∂ ∂ . The sign of 
ij ij a g ∂ ∂  could be negative 
or positive. The larger the plot the more likely that the plot has access to a road which decreases the negotiation 
costs. In this case  0 < ∂ ∂
ij ij a t . On the other hand, 




owners of land have larger transaction costs per unit of land and hence the premium that IF 
have to pay to access the land of small land owners will need to be larger.   
  Third, transaction costs per unit of land will be constant if land ownership is 
distributed equally ( A A
j =  for all j) and homogenously (the plot size distribution is the same 
for all landowners), and if landowners and plots do not vary in other characteristics. In this 
case  g g
ij = ,  G G
J =  and  a a







t + =  
where n is the number of plots per landowner. Fragmentation affects the level of t but not the 
distribution.  
In reality, land ownership is fragmented and relatively egalitarian in the CEECs.  The 
egalitarian distribution is due to a combination of factors (Swinnen, 1997). In many CEECs 
the Communist regimes immediately after World War II, and prior to collectivization, 
implemented radical land reforms, taking away land from large land owners, religious 
institutions and groups that had supported the pro-Nazi regime, distributing it among small 
tenants, landless people, and pro-communist groups.  In other countries, further egalitarian 
land reforms were implemented during collectivization; and in yet other regions, more in 
southern Europe, the Ottoman empire had left a very egalitarian land ownership structure. 
Land restitution restored, and in fact reinforced, these egalitarian land distributions.  In those 
countries where restitution was not widely implemented (Slovenia and Poland) or mixed with 
                                                                                                                                                        
number of neighboring owners may increase which complicates the negotiations over access to a road and 
boundary definitions. In this case the sign of 




other land reform procedures (Hungary and Romania), land ownership is also relatively 
equally distributed.
9  
This implies that fixed transaction costs per unit could be a reasonable approximation 
of reality in many regions of the CEECs.  However, a more general specification is used in 
the analysis and mathematical derivations allowing for both fixed and (monotonically) 
increasing transaction costs. To reduce the complexity of the graphs, only fixed per unit 
transaction costs are used to construct the figures. The derivations will show that almost none 
of the results are affected by whether transaction costs are fixed or increasing per unit of land.   
 
1.4. The Equilibrium with Perfect Competition 
 
The land decision-making problem of a profit-maximizing individual farm (IF) is then: 
(3)  Max 
I I I I A t r A pf ) ( ) ( + − = ∏  
where p is output price, A
I  is amount of land rented by the IF,  (.)
I f  is production function 




















. The first order condition for optimal land use is: 












The optimal level of land rented is where the marginal value product of land, represented by 
the left hand side of (4), equals the IF’s marginal cost of land, r + t.  The marginal cost is the 
rental rate an IF has to pay to a landowner, and which equals the corporate farm rental rate (r) 
plus the transaction costs per unit of land (t).  Condition (4) defines the demand for land of 
the individual farm.  Aggregating this over all (potential) IFs yields the total demand for land 
by individual farms, D
I.  Total IF demand for land is represented in figure 1.1 by D
I for zero 
                                                 
9 Hungary and Romania combined the distribution of land to agricultural workers with the restitution to former 
owners. This contributed to the land ownership fragmentation because the size of land owned by large former 




transaction costs (t=0) and Dt1
I and Dt2
I for transaction costs, t1 and t2, respectively,
 10 with t2 




The vertical axis measures land rental price.  
  For reasons of exposition, consider first that corporate farms are also price takers in 
the land market (we will relax this assumption soon).  In this case the CF demand for land is 
represented by D
C. When there are no transaction costs the equilibrium in the land market is 
at (A
*, r
*).  The land used by the CF equals A
* and the land used by the IF is A
T - A
*.   




*) for transaction 
costs t1 and t2, respectively.  It is obvious from figure 1.1 that with increasing transaction 
costs, the share of land used by corporate farms is higher and the rent they pay is lower.  
Transaction costs allow CF to use more land and at lower costs.   Their gains are equal to area 
A for transaction costs t2.  
Only the CF benefit from these reduced rents.  The land rental price for IFs is the CF 
price plus the transaction costs.  The land rental price for IFs increases with increasing 
transaction costs: from  r
* to rt1
*+ t1 and rt2
*+ t2,  for transaction costs t1 and t2, respectively.  
The losses of IFs are equal to area DE for transaction costs t2.  Landowners also lose because 
their income from land rents declines: without transaction costs they receive r
* per unit of 
land; with transaction costs t2 they only get rt2
* (which equals the rental rate of corporate 
farms and the net per unit payments from IFs after covering transaction costs).  Their losses 
are equal to area ABC for transaction costs t2. The net aggregate welfare losses with t2 are 
equal to area CE, measuring the total transaction costs and area DB, measuring the 
deadweight costs of the induced economic distortions.   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10 (The inverse) aggregate IF land demand is a function of land renting A
I, i.e. D
I(A
I). This follows from 
equation (4) with t=0. The more land IF rents, the smaller rent it is willing to pay. Horizontal aggregation of all 
IF demands determines the aggregate IF land demand. To simplify the text, aggregate IF land demand is denoted 
as D
I. Aggregate IF land demand with transaction costs t is defined as Dt
I = D
I- t. 





1.5. Imperfect Competition 
 
In several CEECs corporate farms may not be price takers in the land rental market.  For 
example, in countries such as Slovakia where they occupy around 90% of the land, corporate 
farms are likely to have important market power.  To model this, assume that there is one 
corporate farm, CF, which recognizes that its land rental decisions will influence the land 
rental price.  The CF is not a monopolist since there is a group of (potential) individual farms 
who are price takers in the rental market.  The IFs will rent land up to the point where their 
demand equals their rental price (ie. r+t).  The CF will take the reactions of the IFs to 
changes in the land rental price into account:  it will adjust its land renting to maximize profit 
subject to the behavior of the IFs.   
  In this situation, the objective function of the corporate farm is the following:  
(5)  Max 
C C C C C A A r A pf ) ( ) ( − = ∏  
where Π
C are CF profits, A
C  is amount of land rented by the CF, r(A
C) represents the rental 
rate as a function of A
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where A
M is the optimal land allocation of the CF. 
The left hand side of condition (6) represents the marginal benefits, i.e. the marginal value 
product of land, and the right hand side is the marginal cost of land for the CF.  The marginal 




more or less land.  The corporate farm will take into account increases in the price of land 
when it rents more land.  It will choose its land use where the marginal cost of land renting 
equals the marginal benefits.  Graphically, this can be represented as in figure 1.2.  For 
simplicity, we assume for a moment that there are no transaction costs (t = 0).  MC
C 
represents the marginal cost function of land renting for the CF.
11  The equilibrium land use 
by the corporate farm is where MC
C equals D
C, ie at A
M.  The resulting CF rental price is r
M.   
Compared to the competitive market equilibrium (A
*,  r
*), the domination of the 
market by the CF leads to a reduction of land use by the CF (A
M < A
*), and a corresponding 
increase of land use by the individual farms.  The land rental price is lower for all farms (r
M < 
r
*).  The surplus gains of the CF are area A – C (>0).  The IFs also gain, by area EGL.  The 
losses are for the landowners who lose rental income equal to area ADEGL.  The effect on 
rural households depends to what extent they are employed by the CF, or are IFs, or 
landowner.  For rural households who are both landowner and individual farmer, the losses in 
rental income may outweigh the gains in farm profits from lower rental prices.   Finally, the 
total welfare effects are negative.  Social costs due to the market power of the CF equals area 
CD.   
  Figure 1.2 also shows the situation of imperfect competition with transaction costs t.  
In this case, the equilibrium is at (At
M, rt
M). The CF rental price falls further to rt
M < r
M < r*: 
both the transaction costs and the market power of CF push the CF rental price down.   
Compared to the competitive market equilibrium with transaction costs (At
*,  rt
*), the 
domination of the market by the CF leads to a reduction of land use by the CF (At
M < At
*), 
and a corresponding increase of land use by the individual farms.  
The combination of imperfect competition and transaction costs results in extra 
                                                 
11 The shape of the marginal cost function is basically determined by the elasticity of individual farmers land 
demand. Since the total land demand is fixed, when the CF rents an additional hectare of land, it must pay a 




benefits for the CF. Relative to the competitive equilibrium without transaction costs (A
*, r
*), 
the surplus gains of the CF equals area ABDE. Landowners lose twice as both factors put a 
downward pressure on rental prices. Their combined loss equals area ABDEGHLN. For 
individual farms the two market imperfections have opposite effects. IFs gain from lower 
rental prices and more land with imperfect competition, but lose from higher rental prices and 
less land with transaction costs. The net effect depends on the relative size of the transaction 
costs. With low transaction costs, the benefits from CF market power will dominate. With 
high transaction costs (as is the case in figure 1.2), the losses due to transaction cost will 
dominate. The net loss for IFs is equal to area FK.
12 The total welfare effects are negative.  




M) implies losses equivalent 
to – KLN –FGH, where KLN represents the total transaction costs incurred and FGH the 
market distortions.  
                                                                                                                                                        
increase of rent for every hectare of land rented (the second term on the right hand side of equation (6)). The 
more inelastic the IF land demand is, the higher is this increase in rent and consequently the steeper the MC
C is. 
12 Notice that if transaction costs would be such that the marginal cost function MCt
C would go through point 
(A
*, r







This chapter developed a partial equilibrium model of the land market in transition countries. 
Specifically, the chapter analyzed the impact of transaction costs and imperfect competition 
on the development of land markets in CEECs. The combination of imperfect competition 
and transaction costs result in depressed land market rents and provide an advantage to CF by 
creating extra benefits to them. Landowners lose because of low land rental price. IF may 
gain or loose from market imperfections. They gain from imperfect competition, while IF 
loose from transaction costs. Overall impact on IF profits depends on which effect is 
stronger.
13  
                                                 















In 2004 eight CEECs, which 15 years ago were still under tight Communist rule, joined the 
EU. Additionally, Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007.  Agricultural issues have played a 
prominent role in the enlargement debate.  Crucial issues were whether a reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was needed to avoid conflicts with budgetary and WTO 
constraints when the CAP would be extended to CEECs and whether CEEC farmers would 
get access to the same subsidies as farmers in the EU-15 (Hartell and Swinnen 2000; 
Tangermann and Banse, 2000).  In fact, the final days before this historic event were spent 
mostly on intense negotiations on agricultural subsidies and production quotas.   
Several studies contributed to the debate by quantitatively estimating the impact of 
EU enlargement in agriculture on EU expenditures, protection levels, commodity markets, 
trade and WTO (e.g. Banse, Münch, and Tangermann, 2000; Ciaian, Pokrivcak, and Bartova 
2005; Frohberg et al. 1998; Hertel, Brockmeier, and Swaminathan, 1997; Münch, 2002; 
Weber, 2000).   
Two important shortcomings of these studies are that they generally ignore the 





to the income distribution effects within the CEEC economies.  The latter is a major 
weakness since much of the policy debate centered on how the implementation of the CAP 
would affect rural incomes in CEECs (European Commission, 2002b; NIAE, 2004).   
The absence of factor market imperfections is also an important shortcoming, since 
rural factor markets in CEECs are characterized by major imperfections, due to the transition 
process and more general rural development problems (Bezemer, 2003; Dries and Swinnen 
2002; World Bank, 2001).  In particular, with respect to CAP payments per unit of land – 
which make up a large share of the CAP subsidies in the new EU member states (NEMS) – 
imperfections of the land markets are crucial since they may have a significant impact on 
both the efficiency and distributional effects of these payments.  Several studies document 
that land markets in the NEMS function imperfectly as land sales are constrained, as 
important transaction costs in the land markets prevent efficiency enhancing land exchanges, 
and as large farm corporations use their monopoly power in local or regional land markets 
(Dale and Baldwin, 1999; Lerman, Csaki, and Feder, 2004; World Bank, 1999).  We focus in 
particular on transaction costs and imperfect competition. 
The objective of this chapter is to analyze explicitly how these land market 
imperfections affect the welfare effects of introducing the CAP in the CEECs, or as of the 
date of accession, the NEMS. The partial equilibrium model of the land market developed in 
the first chapter is used to analyze how the income and efficiency effects of the 
implementation of CAP area payments are affected by transaction costs and imperfect 
competition in the land market in the NEMS.  
The analysis – and the impact of EU accession – is complicated by the reform of the 
CAP which was agreed in 2003 by the EU Council of Ministers.  This reform will have a 
significant impact on the mechanism of CAP support in the future in the NEMS, and in the 
                                                                                                                                                        





last part of the chapter the effects of the introduction of this policy reform are analyzed.   
 
2.2. Impact of Area Payments 
 
Since the 1992 MacSharry reform and the Agenda 2000 reforms, the vast majority of CAP 
subsidies are so-called direct payments (DPs).  In 2006, 34.8 billion euro was spent in the 
EU-15 on direct payments alone.  They make up around two-thirds of the CAP budget and 
include both per hectare payments for some commodities and payments per animal for some 
livestock activities.  They formed one of the most hotly disputed issue in the EU enlargement 
negotiations, as the NEMS insisted on getting full access to DPs, while EU-15 member states 
only wanted to give partial DPs.  The ultimate agreement, reached in Copenhagen in 2002, 
allowed for DPs to be partially introduced from the date of accession and then gradually 
increased, from maximum 55% in 2004 to 100% in 2010.
15  
 Define s as the subsidy (area payment) per unit of land, and assume that all land in the 
analysis qualifies for the subsidies.  The objective function of the IF then changes to  
(7) 
I I I I A s t r A pf ) ( ) ( − + − = ∏ . 
The subsidy s shifts the value marginal product of land curve by s: 










The objective function for the CF changes as well.  
 
Proposition 1:  Area payments benefit only landowners, with and without transaction costs 
and perfect competition in the land market.
  
                                                 
15  The EU budget only pays for 25% in 2004 and gradually increases this amount to reach 100% in 2013.  
However, NEMS governments are allowed to add subsidies from their own budget (the so-called “top-ups”) to a 
combined maximum of 55% in 2004, gradually increasing to 100% by 2010. Also, NEMS have an option to 
combine the total direct payments envelope and grant it per hectare bases, instead of granting it separately per 





Proof: see Appendix A1. 
Figure 2.1 shows the first part of the result.  Without transaction costs and with 
perfect competition in the land market, the IF and CF land demand function with subsidies 
are Ds
I and Ds




*).  Notice that 
the land allocation does not change: A
* = As
*.  Furthermore, the surplus of neither CF nor IF 
is affected.  Their incomes remain unaffected by the subsidy.  All the gains go to the 






  This result holds in general. With transaction costs and imperfect competition in the 
land market, all the benefits of subsidies still go to landowners. Figure 2.2. shows the general 
case.  The subsidy shifts the marginal cost function from MCt
C to MCts
C.  With transaction 





M).  The land allocation does not change: At
M = Ats
M.  Rental prices increase from 
rt
M to rts
M for corporate farms and from rt
M+t to rts
M+t for individual farms.  The difference 
between both rental prices is exactly the size of the subsidy (s = rts
M – rt
M). As a result the 
subsidies get fully captured by land price increases and the surplus of neither CF nor IF is 
affected. All the gains go to the landowners, equal to the sum of areas F + G, which equals 






2.3. Unequal Access to Subsidies 
 
An important assumption behind these results is that both corporate farms and individual 
farms get the same subsidies per hectare.  In reality this assumption may not be correct.  
Access to the payments may be complicated for small individual farmers because of 






16  If so, some of the individual farms may not get access to the payments.  
 
Proposition 2 : With unequal subsidies, area payments benefit landowners and CF, while IF 
lose on average. 
Proof: see Appendix A2. 
To analyze the effect of this, assume that only part of the individual farms get area 
payments.  This will result in a smaller shift of the aggregate IF land demand function than 
would be if all would get the subsidy s.  Define s
I as the “equivalent subsidy”, i.e. the subsidy 
which would cause the same shift in the land demand function if all individual farmers would 
get the same subsidy s
I.  Figure 2.3 illustrates this situation.  For simplicity, we start from 
figure 2.1 where we assumed no transaction costs and perfect competition.  The result of 
unequal subsidies is that the new demand curve Du
I is below the Ds
I curve, while the CF 
demand is still represented by Ds
C.  The new equilibrium is now at (Au
*, ru
*).  Notice that the 
land allocation changes now: Au
* is to the right of A
* = As
*.  Corporate farms use more land 
and individual farms use less.  
Total subsidies allocated equal area ABCDE (to CFs) and F (to IFs).  A large part of 
the subsidies still end up with landowners through an increase in land rental prices, equal to 
area BCEFG.  Individual farmers lose out because the land rental price increases more than 
the subsidies they get: ru
* - r
* > s
I.  Their losses equal area EG.  Corporate farms gain because 
the increase in rental prices is lower than the subsidies they receive: ru
* - r
* < s.  Their gains 
equal area A.  As subsidies now induce distortions in the allocation of land, there are 
deadweight costs, equal to area D and E.  Obviously, the relative sizes of these effects depend 
                                                 
16  A typical requirement is so-called “cross-compliance”, which means that, among others, farms need to fulfil 
some agri-environmental conditions in order to obtain the subsidies. These conditions for example may require 
farmers to meet certain obligations regarding fertilisers, pesticides and seeds use, food safety, landscape quality, 
etc.. Another problematic requirement for IF may be minimum farm size criteria. In countries such as Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Hungary Lithuania and Romania the average IF farm size is between 1 and 4 hectares (table 1.1). 





on the elasticity of the demand curves and on the difference in the subsidies. 
Similar conclusions follow when including transaction costs and market 
imperfections. This is illustrated in figure 2.4. We start from figure 2.2 where transaction 
costs, market imperfections and equal access to subsidies were assumed. For unequal 
subsidies the new marginal costs function, MCu
C, along which the CF decides on the quantity 
of land rented, is below the MCts
C. This leads to a new equilibrium (Au
M, ru
M). The land 
allocation changes. Corporate farms use more land (Au
M > At
M = Ats
M) and individual farmers 
less.  Total subsidies allocated in the equilibrium equal area ABDE. A substantial part of the 
subsidies still go to landowners through increased rental prices, equal to area BDEF. 
Individual farmers lose, while corporate farms gain. The losses to individual farmers equal 
area DF and the gains to corporate farms equal area AC. Because the CF uses its market 
power, it rents less land than socially desirable (see figure 1.2). However, unequal subsidies 
make it profitable for the CF to use more land. This leads to a land allocation that is closer to 
the perfect competition equilibrium. However, if the difference in subsidies obtained by the 
CF and IF is sufficiently large, the CF could even use more land than the equilibrium with 
perfect competition. 
 
2.4. Impact of the 2003 CAP Reform 
 
In 2003 the EU decided to decouple CAP subsidies starting from 2005.  This means, in terms 
of our model, that subsidies will be given as a fixed set of payments per farm, so-called single 
farm payments (SFP).  The SFP for a specific farm equals the support the farm received in 
the previous “reference” period.  The SFP is an entitlement, but future SFP payments depend 
on the farm operating an amount of “eligible hectares” equivalent to the size of the 






C as the total payment for the corporate farm after CAP reform, 
and  AE
C as the amount of eligible area for payments. Assuming that E
C equals the total 
subsidies the corporate farm received with the area payment system, and that all the land it 
used qualifies as eligible land, we have E
C = AE
C . s, which is equal to area F, with AE
C = At
M 
in figure 2.2.  Making similar assumptions for the individual farms, E
I = AE




M, which equals area G in figure 2.2. Hence, payments per eligible hectare, e, are equal 
in this case: e =  e
C = e
I. 
The policy reform has important impacts on the distribution of policy rents.  The first 
implication is that policy rents shift from landowners to farms with the new CAP support 
system. 
 
Proposition 3 :  Decoupled single farm payments benefit only farms, with and without land 
market imperfections.  
The corporate farm and individual farmers are not granted payments for the land that they 
rent above the eligible area, AE
C and AE
I respectively. Consider first the case when the IFs 
want to rent more land, A
I > AE
I. Since the total land supply is fixed, it implies that the CF 
would then rent less land than its eligible area, A
C < AE
C. In this case the respective land 
demand functions are determined by:  
(9)  ) (
I I
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∂
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For the extra land (area A
I - AE
I > 0), IFs cannot pay more than the marginal production value 
of the land. In contrast the CF is willing to pay a higher rent, up to e more. 
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+ = . 
In this case the reverse logic holds. The payments increase the IF land demand. The rent that 
IF is willing to pay is increased by e.  
Equations (9) and (11) for IF and equations (10) and (12) for CF imply kinked land 
demand functions with the SFP. Consider figure 2.2 again. Starting in the left hand side of the 
figure and following the thick lines, IF demand is given by Dt
I Dts
I while CF demand is given 
by Ds
C D










CF marginal cost is represented by thick line MCt
C. At At
M the demands and CF marginal 
costs are represented by thick vertical lines.  
The equilibrium with SFP is (At
M, rt
M). Compared to the area payments, the land 
allocation is the same At
M = Ats
M, but the rental price is lower: the rent will decline from rts
M 
to  rt
M. When the CF rents marginally more land than At




C). Similarly, when IF wants to rent marginally more than A
T - At
M, 
the rent that IF is willing to pay is rt
M (given by Dt
I). The equilibrium land rent will be rt
M. 
Farmers gain all the subsidies, equal to area FG. The gains to the corporate farm equal area F 
and the gains to individual farms equal area G. 
However, this result is conditional upon how potential new entrants in farming are 
treated.  With support now linked to current farms, new farmers (who are potentially more 
dynamic and productive and therefore a source of growth) are excluded from benefiting from 
the support system.  These problems appear particularly problematic in the NEMS where 
major farm restructuring continues to take place, and is required to stimulate the productivity 





grant subsidy entitlements to new entrants. It turns out that these reserve entitlements can 
have an important impact on the total distribution of policy rents. 
 
Proposition 4 :  Benefits of SFP will shift to landowners when new entrants are eligible for 
SFP entitlements, with and without land market imperfections. 
  Proof: The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of proposition 1. When new 
entrants are eligible for the SFP, the IF and the CF marginal conditions with transaction costs 
and imperfect competition are given by equations (11) and (10) respectively, and they are 
equivalent to equations (A1.13) and (A1.14). Thus the effect of SFP with new entrants 
eligible for the payments is equivalent to the effect of area payments. The proof for perfect 
competition is analogous.  
Q.E.D. 
 
The introduction of SFP entitlement to new entrants will induce a rise of the land 
rental price from rt
M to rts
M. The rise is equivalent to the per hectare payment e. The reason is 
that there is an increased demand at the margin. Landowners may rent their land to new 
entrants if the tenants do not pay this price. In the above case, up to area AE
C (=At
M) only 




only incumbent IF were able to do the same. New entrants were not eligible for e.  However, 
if new entrants are eligible for SFP, their marginal benefit of cultivating land equals the 
marginal value product of land plus per hectare payment e. So, a new entrant is willing to 
offer the landowner a higher price for the land. But the farm (either CF or IF) that currently 
uses the land is willing to offer to the landowner a price up to rt
M + e (see figure 2.2). Hence, 
the new entrant and the farm will bid until the rental price will reach rts
M =
 rt
M + e.   










ts + = , because there will be a demand from new entrants who are willing to pay this 
price. However, when the reserve will be exhausted this demand will disappear and the price 
will return back to its pre-reform period level to rt
M. 
In summary, the availability of reserve entitlements for entrants makes that the effects 
of the new CAP system are very similar to the effects of the old CAP system.  When the 
reserve entitlements stop, the effects shift dramatically. In reality, farm managers, new and 
current, may have some expectation on when the reserve runs out and rational agents will 
take this information in consideration. The dynamics of the rental price will reflect this, 
smoothing the price changes. 
 
2.5. EU accession, CAP Reform, and Farm Restructuring 
 
Accession to the EU not only affects the benefits which the NEMS farms receive, but also the 
market imperfections themselves.  In particular, one should expect transaction costs in the 
factor markets, including the land market, to reduce, at least gradually, with EU accession.  
Such reduction in transaction costs comes from a combination of factors, such as legal and 
institutional requirements for EU accession which improve the legal and institutional 
framework in which land market transactions occur.  Improved profitability in farming from 
enhanced productivity of the farms and subsidies will also stimulate land transactions and 
thereby improve experience, transparency, and understanding of the market.   
Such improved functioning of the land market through reductions in transaction costs 
stimulates farm restructuring, transferring land use from less efficient to more efficient 






17  To see this consider figure 1.1.
18 The equilibrium in the land market 
with transaction costs equal to t2 is (At2
*, rt2
*).  With transaction costs reducing to t1, the 
equilibrium shifts to (At1
*,  rt1
*), or when transaction costs fall to zero, the equilibrium 
becomes (A
*, r
*).  It is clear that this implies that land is moved from less productive use by 
the corporate farm to more productive use by individual farms – the difference in marginal 
productivity at (At2
*, rt2
*) equals t2 – up to the point where the marginal productivity in both 
types of farms is equal.  Furthermore, with increased marginal productivity of land at the 
equilibrium, equilibrium land rents have increased with falling transaction costs. These 
results hold in a situation where there are no subsidies.  How do CAP subsidies affect this 
efficiency enhancing effect of EU accession?   
 
Proposition 5  :   
a.  Area payments have no effect on productivity enhancing restructuring in NEMS. 
b.  Reform to single farm payments constrains restructuring.
19 
                                                 
17  Notice that we do not assume that all individual farms are more efficient than all corporate farms.  We 
assume that there are some individual farms that can use (some) land more efficiently than some of the 
corporate farms, as is reflected in the two demand functions.  Without imperfections, the rental market will 
transfer land up to the point where land productivity is equal in corporate farms and individual farms, at the 
margin. As can be seen from our graphs, we assume an “interior solution”, meaning that we assume that in this 
equilibrium, corporate farms will still use some of the land.  These assumptions are consistent with the empirical 
literature. Studies measuring relative farm efficiencies in CEECs typically find (a) that the relative efficiency 
depends on various factors, including the types of activities (eg grain, livestock, vegetables, …), institutions, 
infrastructure and economic conditions, (b) that at least part of the new individual farms are more efficient than 
the corporate farms they replaced, and (c) that the variations in farm efficiency within the “corporate farm” 
group and within the “individual farm” group is often larger than between the groups (see e.g. Mathijs and 
Swinnen, 2001; Gorton and Davidova 2004).   
 
18 Since the argument here is about the impact of the reduction in transaction costs, we limit our argument to the 
perfect competition model – the imperfect competition analysis can be obtained from the authors.  
 
19 It is assumed that entitlements are not transferable. According to the EU regulations 1782/2003 and 795/2004, 
the EU Member States can impose several restrictions on the transfer of entitlements. For example, lease or 
similar types of transactions are allowed only if the payment entitlements transferred are accompanied by the 
transfer of an equivalent number of eligible hectares. A farmer may transfer his payment entitlements without 
land only after (s)he has used at least 80 % of his payment entitlements during at least one year or, after (s)he 
has given up voluntarily to the national reserve all the payment entitlements (s)he has not used in the first year 
of the application of the SFP. Additionally, a Member State may decide that payment entitlements may only be 





c.  Making SFP available to new farms will stimulate restructuring, but cause a transfer of 
policy rents from farms to landowners. 
 
First, let us look at the case of area payments. Figure 2.5 is an extended version of 
Figure 1.1 to illustrate this case. As in figures 2.1-2.4, the subscript s of various curves refers 
to their shape with area payments s. When area payments are introduced, the initial 




*). The reduction in 
transaction costs from t2 to t1 shifts the equilibrium to (At1
*, rt1s
*) and when transaction costs 
disappear (t=0), the equilibrium is (A
*,  rs
*). Notice that the restructuring with the area 
payments is identical to the restructuring without subsidies. With transaction costs falling to 




* and further to A
T - A
* 
when transaction costs go to zero. Hence, the area payments have no effect on the 
restructuring process. 
The effect of the SFP on restructuring is different. The eligible area in the case 
depicted in figure 2.5 is AE
C = At2
* for CF and AE
I = A
T - At2
* for IF. As we explained before, 
in this case the demand curves of IF and CF are kinked, with a shift occurring at At2
* for 
initial transaction costs t2. The equilibrium is at (At2
*, rt2
*). Consider now what happens if 
transaction costs decline from t2 to t1. The kinked land demand curve of IFs shifts up by Δt = 
t2 – t1. This results in a relatively large change in the rental price, but no change in land 
allocation. The new equilibrium is (At2
*, rt1e
*). The increase in rental price (rt1e
* – rt2
*) is 
identical to the decline in transaction costs t2 – t1, which is larger than with area payments. 
The reason is that there is no land reallocation because the decline in transaction costs is 
insufficient to overcome the gap in subsidies between CF and IF for land renting beyond At2
*. 
Even with reduced transaction costs, the marginal value of additional land for the IF at At2
* is 
                                                                                                                                                        






*, which is less than rt2s
*, which is the marginal value of land for the CF at At2
*. 
Only if the reduction in transaction costs (Δt) is larger than the per unit subsidies (e) there 
will be restructuring. To see this, consider what happens when transaction costs fall to zero 
with Δt = t2 > e. Now the IF demand curve shifts from Dt2
I to D
I for land allocations to the 
left of At2
*. This results in a new equilibrium at (Ae
*, re
*). The decline in transaction costs is 
now so large that it more than offsets the subsidy gap at the margin at At2
* and IFs will rent 
more land despite the subsidy gap. This results in restructuring, but still less than without 





Hence, while some restructuring takes place, it is clear that this is less with SFP than 
with area payments. In other words, CAP reform will reduce farm restructuring and will 
restrict productivity gains associated with it. The old CAP system would yield the largest 
change in land allocation from IF to CF. The SFP may even lead to a total freeze of farm 
structures if subsidies are large compared to the reduction of transaction costs.  
Finally, attempts to address this problem by making new individual farms eligible for 
SFPs will stimulate farm restructuring but simultaneously induce a shift of policy rents from 
farms to landowners. The logic is analogous to that of proposition 4. The introduction of 
additional subsidies for new entrants effectively transforms the SFP situation into an area 
payments effect at the margin, stimulating more restructuring, but pushing up rental prices as 
well, shifting CAP benefits to landowners. 
In summary, while the introduction of CAP reform in the NEMS will shift CAP 
benefits from landowners to farms there is an important trade-off.  Restructuring which is 
needed to increase the competitiveness of the NEMS farm system will be constrained.   
Granting the SFP to new entrants mitigates this problem, but will simultaneously induce a 
transfer of policy rents to landowners.  
                                                                                                                                                        





More detailed proof of proposition 5 is provided below:  
Part a: 






T Q  is total output,  ) ( ) (









 and using (A1.9) then we must 
show: 


















With transaction costs (assuming fixed per unit t), perfect competition, and without subsidies 
condition (A1.6) must be satisfied, as well as: 
(14)  t r pf
I
A + =  
(15)  r pf
C
A =  
Totally differentiating equations (A1.6), (14) and (15) yields (A1.9), as well as: 
(16)  dt dr dA pf
I I
AA = −   
(17)  0 = − dr dA pf
C C
AA  














From equations (14) and (15) it results that in equilibrium (at point At2
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Step 2: To show:  ( ) ( )










. (13) implies that this will be the case if 
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A f f f f . 
From proposition 1 it follows that subsidies do not change land allocation. Hence 










. At the initial equilibrium (At2
* in figure 2.5), the marginal productivity of 
land of IF and CF are not affected by s. Hence ( ) ( )









A f f f f .  
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Q.E.D. of part a. 
Part b:  
Assume s = e > 0. Since the SFP effects are not continuous, we analyze part b with discrete 




* is the CF 



















































I A A Δ > Δ  for |Δt| ≤ t. 





In equilibrium (at At2
* in figure 2.5) for ΔA
I >0 the marginal land revenue for the IF remains 
smaller than the marginal land revenue of the CF: 




A + < −  
IF do not get SFP for ΔA
I because they would rent more than the eligible area. The difference 
between the right hand side of equation (20) and the left hand side of equation (20) is equal to 




A = − − + . This follows from proposition 3. 
The reverse holds for ΔA









A = − + − . 
Because e > |Δt|, (20) implies: 




A + < | Δ | − −  
Hence, there will be no change in land allocation:  0 = Δ > Δ
| Δ >| t e
I
s
I A A .  
Case 2: e < |Δt| ≤ t 
The equilibrium with SFP (e) is determined by condition (A1.6) as well as by: 
(23)  ) ( | Δ | − + = t t r pf
I
A  
(24)  e r pf
C
A − =  
The area payments equilibrium is determined by conditions (A1.5), (A1.6) as well as by: 
(25)  s t t r pf
I
A − | Δ | − + = ) ( 





A f f < , and hence that 




I A A  
Q.E.D. of part b. 
Part c: This follows directly from the combination of part a and proposition 4. 






2.6. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
Eastern enlargement of the EU implies integration of the agricultural economies of the 
NEMS in the CAP.  As a consequence farmers in the NEMS receive area payments for the 
land they use, gradually increasing over a transition period. In well functioning land markets 
such payments typically get incorporated in land values and thereby benefit mainly 
landowners and lead to increases in input costs for farmers. However, NEMS rural land 
markets are characterized by important imperfections. 
In this chapter it was shown that, as long as there is competition from individual 
farms, domination of the land market by corporate farms and transaction costs will not affect 
the result that CAP subsidies will end up as increases in land prices and benefit landowners 
instead of farmers.  Furthermore, if the land payments are distributed unequally, for example 
because of problems of small farms in fulfilling the requirements for obtaining subsidies, 
small farmers (especially tenant farmers) may even be net losers from the subsidies, while 
large corporate farms gain, as well as the landowners. 
In the last part of the chapter, it was shown how the 2003 CAP reform has both 
positive and negative efficiency effects in NEMS. While distortions are reduced and policy 
rents are shifted to farmers, restructuring of the farms is blocked. Mitigating this effect 
through reserve entitlements causes a reduction in subsidy benefits for farmers as land prices 
will increase.
20  
                                                 
20 There may occur other situations when all or part of the SFP benefit landowners. We identify two main 
reasons: (i) due to structural changes (e.g. due to change in farm productivity, change in land market transaction 
costs), and (ii) due to restrictions imposed on the transfers of entitlements. If both conditions hold then 
landowners will benefit from the SFP. If structural changes affect relative marginal profitability of farms (in our 
case if IF marginal land profitability is changed relative to CF marginal land profitability) then landowners will 
benefit from SFP. The intuition is similar to the effect of SFP on farm restructuring shown in section 2.5. 
Consider the case when transaction costs are reduced from t2 to t1 (figure 2.5). Smaller transaction costs increase 
the land marginal profitability of IF relative to the land marginal profitability of CF. The new equilibrium rent is 
rt1e
*. Without SFP the rent would increase to rt1
*.  Hence, landowners obtain a higher rent with SFP (rte1
* > rt1





We should caution about simplistic interpretations the results. How the effects 
analyzed in this chapter affect rural households in the NEMS depends on whether the 
households are landowners or farmers, or both, and on the importance of corporate farms.  
These structural conditions differ strongly between NEMS.  For example, farming in 
countries like Slovakia and the Czech Republic is concentrated on large-scale corporate 
farms, who rent most of their land. In Slovakia, CF use 88% of farmland. More than 90% of 
total land used by CF and by IF is rented. Land ownership is very fragmented and many 
landowners are living in urban areas. (Research Institute of Agricultural Economics).  In 
contrast, in countries such as Poland and Slovenia, farming is dominated by small family 
farms (IFs), owning most of the land.  In Poland, IFs cultivate around 87% of the total land 
and own most of the cultivated land. Thus, many farmers are also landowners in Poland. That 
said, it should be noted that (a) there are generational differences, as the most dynamic 
farmers are typically younger and land ownership is typically concentrated in older rural 
households, and (b) that there are also important regional variations: in the north and western 
regions of Poland, larger farms operate on rented (former state farm) land (Csaki and Lerman, 
2001; Dries and Swinnen, 2002).  Most other countries, such as Hungary and Bulgaria, have 
a mixed structure.  For example, in Hungary, IFs use 59% of farm land and CF use 41%.  CF 
rent most of the land they use, while individual farmers operate on a mixture of owned land 
and rented land.  The share of rented land typically increases with the size of the IF (Vranken 
and Swinnen, 2003). Many land owners are living in urban areas, but land ownership is less 
fragmented than in Slovakia.    
                                                                                                                                                        
and benefit from subsidies. An other situation when landowners may benefit from SFP is when there is a 
restriction on entitlement transfers between regions. Again, this effect occurs in combination with structural 
changes. Assume two regions where the total number of entitlements is smaller than the total eligible area. If in 
region one due to economic growth the agricultural land is shifted to non-agricultural use such that the eligible 
area is smaller than the total number of entitlements in the region, then if entitlements cannot be shifted to 
region two, all policy rents will benefit landowners in region one. This effect is similar to the case when new 





  When taking in consideration these facts, the implications of the analysis are different 
for these countries. The most striking difference is between countries such as Poland and 
Slovakia. For most farms in Poland, leakages of policy rents to land owners is less of a 
problem since the dominating farm model is IFs who themselves own the land.  There are 
some problems of rents being concentrated with older farmers who are typically the land 
owners.  In contrast, for many farms in Slovakia and Hungary increased rental rates with the 
introduction of area payments have a significant impact.  Interestingly, there was a persistent 
view in the 1990s that “land markets are not working” and “prices are very low”. All this has 
changed dramatically since 2002.  The anticipation and the implementation of CAP payments 
has strongly pushed up land prices and rental rates in Slovakia and Hungary.  In both 
countries, land owners are benefiting from this, but to a larger extent in Hungary than in 
Slovakia. In Slovakia, large farms are more dominant and have more market power. In 
addition, fragmentation is more excessive and the concentration of land owners in the cities is 
stronger. In combination, these factors increased transaction costs for land owners, and 
reduced their gains. Despite this, CF managers in Slovakia, and in other countries such as the 
Czech Republic, have started lobbying the government to introduce regulations of land rental 
prices, which they claim is “unfairly benefiting urban land owners”.  An alternative strategy 
by CF managers was to lock land owners into long term contracts before land prices started 
increasing.  Surveys show that land rental contracts with CF in Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic are typically longer than with IFs (Swinnen and Vranken, 2004).   
The smallest farms in countries such as Slovakia and Hungary may suffer from the 
subsidies, as they may not get access to subsidies while facing increased land prices. In 
addition to the administrative hurdles, there is a regulatory limit of one hectare in order to 
apply for subsidies. However, this disadvantage may be limited as the smallest farms often 





  The shift from area payments to decoupled single farm payments is planned in a few 
years in NEMS.  The impact on income distribution will be limited in Poland but 
significantly in Slovakia and Hungary. Large CFs are likely to benefit very strongly from the 
decoupled farm payments, as the rents are likely to fall and large income transfers will benefit 
them directly.   
Finally, this change in subsidy instruments may have an undesirable effect on 
restructuring, which is important to increase the competitiveness of the farm sector in the 
NEMS.  The shift to SFPs will limit the pressure for restructuring.  In some of the countries, 
especially Slovakia and Czech Republic, this is likely to constrain much needed further 
restructuring of some of the corporate farms.  This is especially the case since the subsidies 
will increase rapidly over the 2005 – 2013 period and will be large by the time of the SFP 
introduction, possibly outweighing the gains in transaction cost reductions. In this case the 















The second chapter analyzed how land market imperfections affect the welfare effects of 
introducing the CAP area subsidies in NEMS. This chapter considers a general model of 
agricultural sector and introduces credit market imperfections. Little attention has been paid 
to constraints in factor markets in the literature on distributional effects of agricultural 
policies.  The reason is probably that this literature has strongly focused on OECD countries.  
In contrast, studies analyzing effects of agricultural polices in developing or transition 
countries, often include market imperfections as key feature of their models (e.g. Bellemare 
and Barrett 2006; Bhattacharyya, Bhattacharyya, and Kumbhakar, 1996; Fafchamps and Hill 
2005; de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet, 1991; Rizov and Swinnen, 2004; Sadoulet, de 
Janvry, and Benjamin, 1998). However the focus of these studies is how market 
imperfections affect reactions of agents to policy changes and not the distribution of policy 
rents. 
  The present chapter is the first to analyze how credit constraints affect the 
distributional effects of subsidy program. This is somewhat remarkable given the prevalence 
                                                 
21 This chapter is based on the paper which is under review process in the American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 





of credit market imperfections in agriculture. It is well known that rural credit market 
imperfections are widespread in developing and transition countries (eg. Carter, 1988; 
Swinnen and Gow, 1997).
22 However, studies show that also in the US and the EU, farms’ 
access to credit is constrained. In an empirical study of French farmers, Blancard et al (2006) 
find that two-thirds of the farmers in their sample are credit constraint in the short run and all 
of them are credit constrained in the long run.  Lee and Chambers (1986) and Färe, 
Grosskopf, and Lee (1990) find that at least part of the US farms in their study are credit 
constrained.  
  The objective of the present paper is to analyze how credit constraints affect the 
distributional effects of subsidy programs. The policy on which this chapter focuses is an area 
payment (subsidies per unit of agricultural land). Area payments are an important form of 
agricultural subsidies. In 2007, the EU alone spent around 30 billion euros on area payments.  
The importance of area payments as policy instrument is reflected in the fact that several 
recent studies have analyzed their effect, including Alston (2007), Kirwan (2005), OECD 
(2005).  However none of these studies considers the effect of imperfect credit markets. 
 
3.2. The Model  
 
Consider an agricultural economy with n identical farms. The output of each farm is a 
function of the amount of land ( A) and non-land inputs (K ), which we refer to as “fertilizer” 
but which captures also other capital inputs used by the farm. The production function is 
represented by  ) , ( K A f  with  0 > i f ,  0 < ii f ,  0 > ij f , for i, j = A and K.   Total land 
available is assumed to be fixed, 
T A . End of the season profits are: 
                                                 
22 There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature on imperfections in rural credit markets, including the 
seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).   





(26)  ) 1 ( ) , ( i kK rA K A pf + − − = ∏  
where p is the price of the final product, r is the price of land, k  is the per unit price of 
fertilizers and i is interest rate. We assume that the economy is small and open, which 
implies that the fertilizer price and the output price are fixed. Similarly, we assume that 
agriculture is small in terms of credit use and unable to affect interest rates.
23
 
An important issue is the timing of the various activities and payments throughout the 
season.  We assume that fertilizers have to be paid at the start of the season while payment of 
land rents to owners and farms’ revenues from selling the harvest occur at the end of the 
season, after harvest.
24 
 Other inputs, i.e. fertilizer K, need to be financed at the start of the 
season. This can be done through internal finance (savings or cash flow) and/or through 
credit.  
 
Perfect Credit Market  
To establish a point of comparison let us first identify the equilibrium without credit market 
constraints. With perfect credit markets, farms are not constrained on the quantity of inputs 
they use. Farms will choose the quantity of land and fertilizer that will maximize their profits 
                                                 
23 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that if there are different distinguishable groups of borrowers in the 
economy, the equilibrium interest rates are set such that banks’ returns per dollar from each group will be equal. 
If this is not the case, then bank i (which lends to groups that give small returns) would be willing to offer a 
better contract to a group that brings high returns and take away that group of borrowers from competing banks. 
This arbitrage takes until banks’ returns will equal for all groups. If banks’ returns from lending to group j are 
lower than the costs of lending, then banks will not lend funds to group j. In perfect competition bank returns 
will equal bank costs. Note that that the loan rate charged or collateral required by banks will differ among the 
distinguishable groups of borrowers, while bank return obtained from each group will be the same. For example, 
riskier borrowers may be charged higher interest rate in equilibrium than low-risk borrower. In this context, if 
agricultural sector is small, it cannot affect the return that the bank will earn from loaned funds. Banks will set 
such a contract to farms to earn the equilibrium bank market return (opportunity costs) for loaned funds. 
 
24 Although there are no systematic data on this, our inquiries indicate that these assumptions are consistent with 
reality. When land rents are paid in kind or through sharecropping this obviously implies that they are paid after 
the harvest; but also cash payments tend to be paid at the end of the year/season. 





given by equation (26). This implies the following equilibrium conditions (for notational 
simplicity the interest rate i is set equal to zero ( 0 = i )): 
25 
(27)  0 = − r pf A  
(28)  0 = − k pfK  
(29) 
T A A =  
Conditions (27) ─ (29) determine the farm’s input demand functions. Total land demand is 
the aggregate of all n farms land demand functions and represented by function D in figure 
3.1. For illustrative purposes we use linear functions in the figures. The results which we 
illustrate hold in general, as proven by the mathematical derivations – most of which are in 
Appendix. In figure 3.1, with fixed land supply 
T A  and land demand D, the equilibrium rent 
is 
* r .  
  The distribution of policy rents resulting from area payments in this case are well 
known. When there is one input fixed in supply and with fixed prices of other inputs and 
fixed output price, farmers will not benefit from subsidies and all benefits will go to the 
suppliers of the inelastic input, land in this case (see e.g. Alston and James, 2002; Alston, 
2007; Gardner, 1983; Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 2004).  
However, this conclusion assumes that credit markets work perfectly (or, in other 
words, that there are no constraints on the supply of other inputs (fertilizers)). In the next 
section we will show that these results change when access to credit is constrained. 
                                                 
25 While this may appear at first sight as a strange assumption in an analysis of credit market imperfections, this 
assumption does not affect the results because credit market imperfections in this paper are modelled as 
constraints on the amount of credit rather then its cost, as is standard in the literature (see further). Hence setting 
i=0 merely simplifies the notation, but does not affect the results.  






3.3. Imperfect Credit Market 
 
To model the imperfect credit market, we use the approach of Feder (1985) and Carter and 
Wiebe (1990) by introducing a farm credit constraint.
26  It is assumed that the maximum 
amount of credit available to farm, S , depends on farm characteristics (W ) such as 
reputation, farm size and wealth. That is  ( ) W S S =  with  0 > W S . The credit constraint is 
given by: 
(30)  ) (W S kK ≤  
With a credit constraint the decision-making problem of the farms is the maximization 
of the end-season profit functions, as given by equation (26), subject to credit constraint (30), 
as represented by the LaGrangean function: 
(31)  () S kK kK rA K A pf − − − − = Ψ λ ) , (  
where λ  is the shadow price of the credit constraint.   
When the credit constraint is binding farms cannot use the unconstrained optimal level 





= . Farms then choose their land 
allocation to maximize profits, treating fertilizer use as fixed.
27  
The optimal conditions with binding credit constraints ( 0 > λ ) are given by (29) as 
well as by: 
(32)  0 = + r pf A  
(33)  () 0 1 = + − λ k pfK  
                                                 
26 See also Carter (1988) for a credit rationing model for the farm sector in the context of developing countries 
and Barry and Robinson (2001) for a more elaborate discussion of credit markets in agriculture. 
 
27 In similar context Just, Hueth, and Schmitz (2004) analyze the welfare measurement with constrained input 
use due to policy intervention. The difference here is that we consider the input constraint caused by insufficient 





(34)  0 = − S kK . 
From equation (33) it follows that the marginal value product of fertilizers is higher than the 
marginal cost of fertilizers k:  k pfK > . By increasing fertilizer use the farm could increase its 
profit but it cannot because of the credit constraint.  From the characteristics of the 
production function ( 0 > AK f ) it also follows that credit constraints affect the land market. 
The more credit constrained farms are, the less fertilizers they use and the lower their land 
demand, ceteris paribus. 
The effect of credit constraints on the land market is illustrated in figure 3.1. As 
explained before, the aggregate land demand curve without credit constraints is D.  The 
equilibrium rent without credit constraints is 
* r . When credit is constrained, farm land 
demand shifts to Dc. At low levels of output (and thus land use) the credit constraint is not 
binding, and the constrained demand curve Dc  coincides with the unconstrained demand 
curve D. This is up to the point x where the credit constraint becomes binding and the 
constrained demand curve shifts below the unconstrained demand curve. The gap between D 
and  c D  increases for higher levels of land as the reduction in productivity caused by the 
credit constraint increases. With the credit constraint binding, and reflected in  c D , the new 
equilibrium land rent is 
*
c r . The equilibrium rent declines to 
* * r rc < .  
Notice that while land demand is affected, land use is not affected in figure 3.1. The 
functions, as drawn, assume that even with credit constraints the marginal value products of 
all the land available (A
T) is positive (as the land demand function still lies above the vertical 
axis at A
T). Hence, if this is the case, all the adjustments in the land market occur through 
price adjustments while in the fertilizer market they occur through quantity adjustments with 
fixed prices.  
                                                                                                                                                        






3.4. Impact of Area Payments 
 
Define s as the subsidy (area payment) per unit of land, and assume that all land in the 
analysis qualifies for the subsidies.  The representative farm objective function then changes 
to  
(35)  kK A s r K A pf − − − = ∏ ) ( ) , (.  
However, not only the objective function will change; also the credit constraint is 
affected.  The payments will alleviate the credit constraint of the farm.  In reality farms may 
receive the subsidies at the beginning or at the end of the season. It may be at the end because 
of administrative delays or because of administrative controls to check the eligibility of the 
farms which need to take place during the growing season.
28 
If the farm receives the subsidies at the beginning of the season, farm can use the 
funds directly to pay for the fertilizer. However, even if farms receive subsidies at the end of 
the season, this can still improve their access to credit. If farms and potential lenders know 
that subsidies will be paid at the end of the season, then farmers may be able to use these 
future (guaranteed) payments to obtain credit from credit institutions at the beginning of the 
season. For example, our own research in Eastern Europe showed that the provision of area 
payments under the EU’s CAP had a major effect on farms’ access to credit. We found from 
field interviews that banks and other lenders are more willing to provide credit to farms when 
they know that such subsidies will be paid. In a sense, (the promise of) subsidies are used as 
collateral for credit. For example, banks in Slovakia provide credit to farms up to 100% of 
their area payments in 2007, so the farms can use the funds to finance expenses at the start of 
                                                 
28 In reality, policies may impose restrictions on which land can receive payments. Restrictions may relate to 
crop choice, set-aside requirements, cross-compliance, etc. These restrictions may affect the distributional 
effects. Here we analyze the case when all land does qualify for subsidies. 





the growing season. To obtain such loans, the farms need to have an account at the bank 
where the area payments will be deposited later by the official paying agency, and the banks 
have control over the account in order to recuperate the pre-financing.     
In our analysis, we allow for subsidies to arrive either at the start of the season or after 
harvest.  With area payments the credit constraint is given as follows: 
(36)  sA W S kK α + ≤ ) (,  
where  1 0 ≤ ≤α , and α  measures the extent to which the farm can use subsidies to alleviate 
its credit constraint. If the farm receives subsidies at the beginning of the season, the farm can 
use all subsidies to alleviate the credit constraint: in this case  1 = α . However, if the farm 
receives the subsidy at the end of the season, it may obtain an amount of credit equivalent to 
the size of the subsidy or less, depending on the farm’s ability to borrow.  In this case 
1 0 ≤ ≤α .  
 
Proposition 6: When farms are credit constrained it holds that with the introduction of area 
payments (and with farms being able to use subsidies to alleviate their credit constraint, 
0 > α ) land rents increase by more than the subsidy. 
Proof: see Appendix A3. 
 
Land rents will increase with area payments, but contrary to when there are no credit 
constraints, the increase in rent is higher than the allocated subsidy, s. This is because the 
payments have two effects on land rents, a direct and an indirect one. This is illustrated in 
figure 3.2. The initial equilibrium rent with credit constraints is rc
*. The first, direct, effect is 
the standard effect of subsidies with a fixed production factor (land): because farms are 
granted subsidies per hectare they rent, this increases marginal returns to land, and increases 





reflected in the an upward parallel shift of land demand  c D  to  s Dc + . This effect alone 
would result in land market rent, rcs
s. The increase in rent is equal to the size of the subsidy s, 
rcs
s - rc
* = s. 
The second, indirect, effect is that the subsidies relax farms' credit constraints which 
allows farms to purchase more fertilizer. This increases the marginal value product of land if 
farms are credit constrained and further increases farms’ land demand, thereby inducing a 
higher rent, reinforcing the first, direct, effect. This second effect results in a further shift of 
land demand from  s Dc +  to Dcs. The equilibrium rent is rcs
*. It is clear from figure 3.2 that 
the rent rises by more than the subsidy, rcs
* - rc
* > s. 
The size of this second effect depends on the impact of the subsidy on the credit 
constraint. In figure 3.2 we assume that the subsidy reduces the credit constraint but does not 
fully remove it over the domain 
T A − 0 . More specifically, the subsidy causes the credit 
constraint to be no longer binding over the interval 
s c A A − , and to constrain the land 
productivity less over the domain 
T s A A − . Beyond 
c A , the vertical distance between Dc. and 
Dcs increases with land renting. Graphically this is reflected in the fact that over this domain 
the land demand function without subsidy (Dc) is not parallel with the land demand with 
subsidy (Dcs). The (absolute value of) slope of the land demand with subsidy (Dcs) decreases 
relative to the slope of the land demand without subsidy (Dc). 
In drawing Dcs we assumed that the credit constraint is still binding over the area 
T s A A − . If the subsidy effect would be so strong to remove the constraint over the whole 
T A − 0  domain, the land demand function would shift to 
s D  and the resulting land rent 
would be 
*
s r . However, it is important to realize that even if the second effect has only a 
small impact on the land demand, the combined effect will be that the land rent goes up by 






Proposition 7: When farms are homogenous and are credit constrained, it holds that with the 
introduction of area payments (and with farms being able to use subsidies to alleviate their 
credit constraint,  0 > α ) all farms lose compared to the case without subsidies. 
Proof: see Appendix A4 part a. 
 
A formal derivation is in Appendix A2. The graphical analysis is in figure 3.2. To 
simplify the graph and the discussion, we consider the extreme case when the subsidies fully 
solve the credit constraint (the formal analysis in Appendix hold for the general case). The 
subsidy shifts demand to  s D  and land rent to 
*
s r . Farms gain from subsidies and from 
improved productivity with reduced credit constraints; they lose from the increase in land 
rents. First, the farms’ gains from subsidies equal area ABCE and this is identical to the losses 
from the “direct” effect of the subsidies on land rents (also area ABCE). So these two effects 
exactly offset each other. Second, the farms’ gains from improved productivity with reduced 
credit constraints equal area CFG. The farms’ losses from the “indirect” effect on land prices 
is represented by area CGHJ. The net effect is always negative: the net losses to farms equal 
area CFHJ, which is the difference between area CGHJ, which is equivalent to area CGKE 
(indirect loss), and area CFG (productivity gains).
29  
The intuition behind this result is as follows. While the subsidy is the same for all 
land, this is not the case for the effect of the credit constraint. If the farms would use land up 
to 
c A , there would be no additional effect of the credit constraint reduction on land rents. 
Beyond 
c A , the effect of the credit constraint on farm productivity ( 0 > AK f ) increases with 
                                                 
29 Note that these changes incorporate adjustments in fertilizers use and that the welfare change represented by 
area CFHJ in figure 3.2 is an accurate representation of farm profit change induced by the subsidy. (see Just, 
Hueth, and Schmitz 2004 for a general discussion and applications to different issues). 





land renting. The productivity loss is represented by the distance between the D and  c D  
functions, which increases with land use. The gap is highest at 
T A .  
Reducing the credit constraint has the strongest effect at the margin, where the credit 
constraint is strongest, and where the land rent is determined. At the margin the increase in 
productivity with reduced credit constraints equals the additional increase in land rents. 
However for the rest of the land this is not the case. As a consequence the gains in land 
productivity are lower than the increase of the land rent for all the land except for the unit at 
the margin.  
 
Proposition 8: When farms are credit constrained it holds that with the introduction of area 
payments (and with farms being able to use subsidies to alleviate their credit constraint, 
0 > α ) total welfare increases. 
Proof: see Appendix A4 part b. 
 
The welfare effects are also illustrated in figure 3.2. Landowners gain from the higher 
rental price. Their gains are equal to area ABGK. Area ABCE is the size of the total subsidy, 
which equals the taxpayers’ cost. The net losses to farms equal area CFHJ. From the 
assumption of a small and open economy, with fixed prices for fertilizer, output, and fixed 
interest rates, it follows that the welfare of fertilizer suppliers, credit suppliers and consumers 
will not be affected by the subsidies. Hence, the total welfare effect is positive and equals 
area CFG. Total welfare increases because the subsidies solve the credit market imperfection 
and thereby increase productivity, and total production.
30 Notice that in this specific case 
                                                 
30 There exist a value of the area subsidy denoted as  c s  which exactly removes the farm credit constraint. If the 
actual subsidy s is lower than  c s  ( c s s < ) then farms remain credit constraint with s. If the actual subsidy s is 





there are no deadweight costs because the land supply is assumed fixed and all land receives 
subsidies. Hence, there are no distortions in land allocation.  
 
3.5. Heterogeneous farms 
 
The analysis so far assumed that farms were identical. We will now relax this assumption. 
For simplicity we consider the situation when there are two farms who differ in their credit 
constraints.
31 
The effect of differences in credit constraints on the land allocation and the land rent 
is illustrated in figure 3.3. The land demand curves of farm 1 and farm 2 without credit 
constraints are D
1 and D
2 and their land use is A
1 and A
2, respectively, with 
1 2 A A A
T − = . 
The equilibrium without credit constraint is (
* *,r A ). When credit is constrained, the land 
demand curves of farm 1 and farm 2 shift to Dc
1 and Dc
2, respectively. The new equilibrium 
shifts to (
* *, c c r A ). The land market rent declines, 
* * r rc < . The change in land allocation 
between farms depends on the farms’ relative credit constraints. In the case illustrated in 
                                                                                                                                                        
the subsidy  c s  because it removes the farm credit constraint. In this partial equilibrium model the subsidy is the 
first-best policy because it corrects market imperfections while it does not create distortions. If one takes in 
consideration welfare losses induced by taxes (which are needed to finance the subsidy) then the first best 
outcome cannot be achieved. 
 
31 Empirical evidence shows important differences among farms in their credit constraints. For example, Bierlen 
and Featherstone (1998) find in the US that a farms’ debt levels are the strongest determinant of credit 
constraints, while asset size and age are less important. Benjamin and Phimister (2002) find that differences in 
the structure of agricultural credit markets alter farm credit constraints. They find that in the case of the UK 
where non-specialized commercial banks dominate and with little government interventions, farms with less 
collateral were more credit constrained, while in France with dominant specialized agricultural cooperative bank 
and with extensive government interventions, farm credit is less dependent on collateral. Closer relationships 
between the cooperative bank and farms in France address better information asymmetry and reduce the reliance 
on collateral. Bezemer (2003) finds in the case of the Czech Republic that long-established and larger corporate 
farms have better access to credit than small individual farms. Latruffe (2005) finds in the case of Poland that 
farmers with more assets were less credit constrained than others. This may differ from the situation in more 
developed market economies. 





figure 3.3, farm 2 is assumed to be more credit constrained than farm 1. As a result, farm 2 
renting is lower by 
* * A Ac − , compared to the unconstrained equilibrium. 
  
Proposition 9: When farms differ in their credit constraints it holds that with the introduction 
of area payments (and with farms being able to use subsidies to alleviate their credit 
constraint,  0 >
i α ), the farms that are less credit constrained will loose and farms that are 
more credit constrained may gain.  
Proof: see Appendix A5. 
 
Again the formal derivations are in appendix and we use a graphical analysis to 
illustrate these effects (figure 3.3). With area payment s, farm 2 land demand shifts upwards, 
from Dc
2 to Dcs
2. Farm 1 demand shifts from Dc
1 to Dcs
1. As explained earlier, we have two 
effects. First, farm 1 and 2 land demand shift to Dcs1
1 and to Dcs1
2, respectively, because of 
the direct subsidy effect which increase marginal returns to land. This results in a higher land 
market rent, rcs
s. The increase in rent is equal to the size of the subsidy s (rcs
s - rc
* = s) and 
affects both farms simultaneously. Second, because farms can use subsidies to buy more 
fertilizers, this increases the marginal productivity of land and thus land demand. This 
indirect effect results in a further shift of farm 1 land demand from Dcs1
1 to Dcs
1, and for farm 
2 from Dcs1
2 to Dcs
2. The equilibrium is (Acs
*, rcs
*). It is clear from figure 3.3 that the rent rises 
by more than the subsidy (rcs
* - rc
* > s) as in the case with homogenous farms.  
However now the impact differs between the two farms. While both farms see their 
credit constraint reduced and will increase fertilizer use and thereby increase their 
productivity, this effect is stronger (at the margin) for the farm which has the strongest 
marginal productivity losses due to credit constraints. The farm which is most credit 





benefits most from the reduction in its credit constraint, leading to higher land marginal 
productivity gains. The farm which is less credit constrained, i.e. farm 1, definitely loses 
because its increase in land rental costs  ) (
* *
c cs r r −  is higher than the increase in marginal 
return of land for every hectare it rents (the distance between 
1
cs D  and 
1
c D  is smaller than 
) (
* *
c cs r r −  for land renting equal to or smaller than 
*
cs A ). Its total losses are equal to area JKL 
minus area CEGK (<0).
  The farm which is most credit constrained, i.e. farm 2 in figure 3.3, 
may gain or may lose, depending on whether the increase in returns to land (the distance 
between 
2
cs D  and 
2
c D  for land renting smaller than
*
cs
T A A − ) are larger or smaller than the 
increase in land rent  ) (
* *
c cs r r − . In figure 3.3 it is unclear whether area LMON minus area 
EFHM is positive or negative – and this result holds in general (see proof in Appendix A5).  
If the differences in credit constraints are small, both farms will lose. As an 
illustration of this, notice that in the extreme when differences are small, we end up with the 
case of homogenous farms. As we have shown before, all farms will lose from area payments 
in this case (see propositions 6 and 7). However, if there is a sufficiently large difference in 
credit constraints, and hence a sufficiently strong productivity effect at the margin for the 
most constrained farm (farm 2), farm 2 may gain. Moreover, while farm 1 will always lose, 
under specific conditions it is possible that the aggregate impact on farms is positive, i.e. that 
the sum of area JKL and area LMON is larger than the sum of area CEGK and area EFHM. 
This may occur in the case when farms that are less credit constrained have very elastic land 
demand and farms that are more credit constrained have a relatively high increase in 
productivity induced by more fertilizer use. In this case the indirect effect of subsidies on the 
equilibrium land rent is small while credit constrained farms have high productivity gains. 
This is illustrated in figure 3.4 which presents a case where farm 2 has important credit 





With high farm 1 demand elasticity, the impact of farm 2 productivity gains on land rents is 
small and its net gains in productivity (area GHNM) are larger than the net losses in higher 
land rents (area DELH). The losses to farm 1 are small given by area CDGF and this loss 
decreases with the farm 1 demand elasticity. The aggregate impact of area payments on farm 
profits is likely to be positive as losses are small (area DELH and area CDGF) and gains are 
large (area GHNM). In other cases farms are likely to lose on aggregate. 
 
3.6. Sensitivity Analyses and Household Effects  
 
To analyze the sensitivity of our findings to some of our assumptions, we use a simple 
simulation exercise. We simulate the model with homogenous farms, using a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, 
2 1 β β K BA Q = , where B  is a constant and  1 β  and  2 β  are input 
parameters.  
Data for France were used to calibrate the model. We use average data for 2003 and 
2004 (sources are European Commission and Eurostat). Total agricultural output was used as 
proxy for Q, non-land costs were used as proxy for K , and utilized agricultural area was 
used as proxy for  A. The cost share of land in total costs of agricultural production  1 β  was 
calculated from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) and equals approximately 0.1. 
This is lower than the value which Alston (2007) used (land cost share equal to 0.2) in a 
simulation model for the US. However, other studies also use lower land cost shares for the 
EU than for the US. OECD (2000) estimates the land cost share for different crops in the EU 
between 0.14 and 0.18, and in the US between 0.21 and 0.27. The GTAP model for grains 
uses a land cost share of 0.12 for the EU and 0.2 for North America (van Meijl and F. van 
Tongeren, 1999). Given the fact that France is relatively land abundant within the EU, its 





vary this parameter to asses the sensitivity of the results. With a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, the cost share of non-land inputs in total costs of agricultural production  2 β  was 
0.9. To account for the credit constraint, we used estimations of Blancard et. al (2006) to set 
the shadow price of the credit constraint equal to 1.35. We also vary this parameter. 
  Consistent with the theoretical model our base simulation model has a fixed land 
supply and infinitely elastic output demand and fertilizer supply. We then relax these 
assumptions with simulations using different elasticities of land supply, output demand and 
fertilizer supply. Following Alston (2007) we use land supply elasticities of 0.1 and 0.2. The 
most commonly used values of output demand elasticities in the literature are between -0.1 
and -0.7 (e.g. Floyd 1965; Hertel, 1989; Tiffin and Tiffin, 1999; de Crombrugghe et. al, 1997; 
Van Driel, Nadall, and Zeelenberg, 1997; OECD, 2000; FAPRI). We use variations in output 
demand elasticities of -0.3, -0.7 and infinity. Supply elasticities of non-land inputs in the 
literature vary widely: between 0.1 and 3 (Balcombe and Prakash, 2000; Floyd 1965; OECD, 
2000; Ryan and Duncan, 1974; Thijssen, 1988), because it covers a wide range of inputs (e.g. 
fertilizers, fuel, labour) which have various reactions to prices. It also depends whether inputs 
are farm supplied or purchased. Purchased inputs tend to be more elastic than farm supplied 
inputs. In our simulations we will use 0.5, and 1.5, and infinity.  
The results are summarized in table 3.1. The numbers represent losses or benefits 
from the introduction of area subsidies measured as a share of total subsidies. The results are 
consistent with the theory. The basic simulation shows that farms loose (-12%), while 
landowners gain more than the subsidy (178%) with a fixed land supply and with infinitely 
elastic output demand and fertilizers supply. Total welfare increases by 67% of the subsidy 
amount.  
Models 2 and 3 show that with lower elasticity of non-land input supply non-land 





slightly less policy rents are transferred to landowners but farms lose even more (-53% to -
81%). Also welfare increases less (+20% to +40%).   
A similar effect occurs with less elastic output demand. Now consumers also benefit 
from the subsidy (+165 to +381%) while most of these consumer benefits come from strong 
decreases in farm surplus (-160% to -355%), and less effects on landowners and total welfare.   
With more elastic land supply (model 6 and 7) farms gain, but only limited: from 1% 
to 13%. These gains come from landowners whose gains are lower.   
A higher α  implies higher losses to farms (-18) because the “indirect” productivity 
effect increases with α . Landowners benefit more: +217% in model 9.
32 A higher  1 β  (hence 
lower 2 β ) (model 10) also implies larger losses to farms (-24%) and higher gains to 
landowners (+190%). Benefits from policy to landowners increase with the importance of 
land in the production. On the other hand, with credit constraint, the increase in productivity 
(and increase in land prices) caused by the alleviation of credit constraint decreases with 
lower  2 β . In the simulation in table 3.2 the former effect is stronger then the latter effect. 
Finally, from a policy perspective it is obviously important when interpreting these 
distributional effects whether “farms” and “landowners” are the same persons (or 
households), or not. These structural conditions differ strongly around the world (Swinnen, 
Stanley, and Vranken, 2006). For example, farms rent more than 65% of their land in EU 
countries like Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Belgium and France. Many landowners are 
living in urban areas. In contrast, in countries such as Ireland, Poland, Latvia, and Italy, on 
aggregate farms own more than 70% of their land. The situation in the US is in between both 
groups of countries.  
                                                 
32 Notice that with  0 = α  all policy benefits go to landowners. In this case farms cannot use subsidies to 





To measure the implications, table 3.2 presents simulations results for three scenarios: 
farms own 25%, 50%, or 75% of their land, respectively. The results in table 3.2 show that 
land-owning-farms gain from area payments except (a) when they own relatively little land 
(25%) and the supply of non-land inputs is inelastic and (b) when demand is inelastic. The 
latter is an important result since this applies to most developed countries, and farming 
households even lose when they own most of their land (75%). 
 
3.7. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
In this chapter we have shown that imperfections in rural credit markets may strongly affect 
the incidence of agricultural policy. When farms are credit constrained, the introduction of 
area payments will lead to even larger gains for landowners as land rents will increase by 
more than the subsidy.  This is because the subsidies will reduce farms’ credit constraints and 
thereby increase marginal productivity of land and thus land demand. This will increase land 
prices in addition to the direct subsidy effect.  The effect of area payments on farm profits 
with homogenous farms is negative. Farms gain directly from the subsidy and indirectly from 
the increase in productivity. However they lose from the increase in land rents. The land rent 
increase is larger than their gains, causing a negative net impact.  If farms are heterogeneous, 
the most credit constrained farms (ex ante) and those which are most effective in using the 
subsidies for the reduction of their credit constraints may gain.  
  The model used in this chapter is applicable to any economy where farmers face credit 
constraints. This is typically case in the developing countries where credit market 
imperfections are well documented (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986; Conning and Udry, 
2005). Rural credit constraints in developing economies are closely associated with access to 





Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) showed that land is one of the most suitable asset to be 
used as a collateral because it satisfies three main conditions: appropriabilitty, absence of 
collateral-specific risk, and accrual of the returns to the borrower during the loan period. 
Land ownership is unequally distributed in many developing countries which leads to a 
differential access to credits with the strongest credit constraint facing landless farms. The 
combination of unequal land ownership (or unequal wealth ownership in general) and credit 
constraints results in unequal income distribution and welfare losses which may persist over 
time (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Tsiddon, 1992; Carter and Barham, 1996; Binswanger and 
Deininger 1997). The analysis of this chapter indicate that a better farms’ credit access leads 
to expansion of the most constrained farms and to welfare gains. Many developing countries 
have implemented policies to address credit market imperfections (Conning and Udry, 2005). 
However, many of these polices resulted in a biased allocation of credit benefiting mostly 
medium and large farms and thus further strengthening their access to credit (Adams, 
Graham, and Von Pischke 1984; Von Pischke, Donald, and Adams 1983; Binswanger and 
Deininger 1997; Burgess and Pande 2003). This was either because developing countries face 
many market imperfections and addressing credit market imperfection alone is not sufficient, 
or because richer farmers are more successful in lobbing governments. 












4.1. Introduction  
 
A well functioning land market facilitates land transfer from less productive farms to more 
productive ones and leads to efficient allocation of resources. The literature has analyzed 
different factors that affect the efficiency of the land market such as imperfect credit markets 
(Carter and Salgado, 2001; Kevane, 1996; Shaban, 1991 and Laffont and Matoussi, 1995), 
labor market imperfections (Yao, 2000), insecure property rights (Feder, Onchan, and 
Raparla, 1988 and Alston et al, 1995 and 1996), missing insurance markets (Cain, 1981), 
complexity of the processing and marketing of agricultural products (Kutcher and Scandizzo, 
1981), economy of scale in agriculture and lumpy inputs (Rao, 1975), and policy distortions 
(Feldstein, 1980 and Brandao and Rezende, 1992).  
An important assumption of all these studies is perfect competition in the land 
markets.  This is not realistic in many regions where land use is dominated by large farms, 
such as, for example, in Latin American or in several African countries. Similarly, in several 
transition countries large corporate farms use a large share of agricultural land.  For example, 
they use more than 80% in countries such as Belarus, Slovakia, and Russia and more than 
50% in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (see table 1.1).  The average 





farming companies use more than 100,000 hectares.  
Large scale corporate farms continue to use large parts of the land because of a variety 
of reasons. However, an important reason is that historically, the large-scale farms were the 
users of the land and transaction costs constrain the shift of land to new farms (see chapter 1).  
The interaction of imperfect competition and transaction costs has a strong impact on 
the efficiency of the land market, and on land prices and payments. In several transition 
countries there is a large gap in rental prices between land used by corporate farms and land 
used by individual farms.  For example, Vranken and Swinnen (2006) find that in Hungary 
land prices are lower in regions where corporate farms dominate. Table 1.2 shows how in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia land rents paid by corporate farms are generally much lower: 
most vary between 50% and 20% of the rents paid by family farms.  Further, in several 
countries, corporate farms are more likely to pay their rents in kind, while family farms are 
more likely to pay cash or mixed cash/in-kind (Swinnen and Vranken, 2005).  
The objective of this chapter is to explicitly model imperfect competition in the land 
market and to analyze the efficiency and welfare effects of reforms which reduce transaction 
costs. We show that the efficiency gains from transaction cost reductions are mitigated, and 
can even be offset. To show these effects, we use a model which incorporates features which 
are consistent with the land market situation in transition countries where large farms remain 
important. However, the analysis and figures in this chapter are relevant as well for other 
parts of the world with unequal land use, such as in Latin America or Africa. 
The analysis in this chapter is related to studies on second best polices and policy 
effects in the presence of distortion (see e.g. Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956; Aronsson and 
Blomquist, 2003; Blackorby, Davidson, and Schworm, 1991; Boadway and Harris, 1977; 





Schmitz, 1993; Innes, 2002 in agricultural policies). The chapter is, to our knowledge, the 
first to analyze these issues in the context of land markets and reforms.  
 
4.2. The Equilibrium with Perfect Competition 
 
In chapter 1 it was shown (see also appendix A6) that with increasing transaction costs, the 
share of land used by corporate farms is higher and the rent they pay is lower.  With 





transaction costs t1 and t2, respectively. Transaction costs allow CF to use more land and at 
lower costs.   Their gains are equal to area A for transaction costs t2. 
Only the CF benefit from these reduced rents.  The losses of IFs are equal to area DE 
for transaction costs t2.  Landowners also lose because their income from land rents declines: 
without transaction costs they receive r
* per unit of land; with transaction costs t2 they only 
get rt2
*.  Their losses are equal to area ABC for transaction costs t2. The net aggregate welfare 
losses with t2 are equal to area BCDE with EC measuring the total transaction costs and area 
DB, measuring the deadweight costs of the induced economic distortions (see appendix A6).  
 
4.3. Imperfect Competition 
 
Corporate farms are not price takers in the land rental market in many regions.  For example, 
in countries such as Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, among 
others, where they occupy more than 80% of the land (see table 1.1), CF have important 
market power.
33   
In chapter 1 it was shown that the combination of imperfect competition and 
transaction costs results in extra benefits for the CF. As figure 1.2 shows, relative to the 
                                                 





competitive equilibrium without transaction costs (A
*, r
*), the surplus gains of the CF with 
imperfect competition and transaction costs t equals area ABDE. Landowners lose twice as 
both factors put a downward pressure on rental prices. Their combined loss equals area 
ABDEGHLN (figure 1.2 and appendix A7).  
For individual farms the two market imperfections have opposite effects. IFs gain 
from lower rental prices and having more land due to imperfect competition, but lose because 
of higher rental prices and having less land due to transaction costs. The net effect depends 
on the relative size of the transaction costs. With relatively low transaction costs, the benefits 
from CF market power will dominate. With relatively high transaction costs (as is the case in 
figure 1.2), the losses due to transaction cost will dominate. The net loss for IFs is equal to 
area FK
 34  (see also appendix A7). 
The effect of the two market imperfections are also opposite in terms of land 
allocation. To illustrate this, consider the special case shown in figure 4.1. We denote t
* as the 
level of transaction costs for which the CF marginal cost curve (MCt*
C) crosses the 
equilibrium with perfect competition and no transaction costs (A
*,  r
*). With perfect 
competition and transaction costs t











*. However, with imperfect competition and t
* the land allocation 




M. There are no land allocation distortions with the 
combination of t
* and imperfect competition.
35 Transaction costs smaller than t
* and 
imperfect competition would imply that the equilibrium will be to the left of the competitive 
equilibrium. In this case IF rent more land than the socially optimal level. With transaction 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
34 Notice that if transaction costs would be such that the marginal cost function MCt
C would go through point 
(A
*, r
*) that both effects would exactly offset each other and the combined impact on IF welfare would be zero. 
 










costs larger than t
* the equilibrium is to the right of the competitive equilibrium. IF rent less 
land than the socially optimal level. 
However, it is important to point out that, while the allocation of land with the 
combination of imperfections equals the optimal allocation, the total welfare effects are 
always negative (for a formal proof see appendix A7 part b). In figure 1.2 compared to the 




M) implies losses equivalent to – KLN –FGH, 
where KLN represents the total transaction costs incurred and FGH the market distortions. 
For the special case in figure 4.1, there are no land allocation distortions. Only land market 
rent is affected, rt*
M < r
*. For this reason landowners lose relative to perfect competition and 
zero transaction costs equilibrium. Their loses equal to DEFGHJK. A part of this loses are 
transferred to CF, equal to area DEFHJ. The rest, area GK, are transaction costs. IF welfare is 
not affected. But social welfare is negatively affected: the net welfare effect is negative equal 
to area GK. 
 
4.4. Effects of Reforms: Reduction of Transaction Costs and More 
Competition 
 
Institutional and economic reforms can lead to increased competition and reduced transaction 
costs. For example, in European transition countries which joined the EU, the legal and 
institutional reforms which were required as part of the EU accession process improve the 
legal and institutional framework in which land transactions occur. At the same time, reforms 
which enhance profitability and productivity of the farms, for example through stimulating 
foreign investment in the processing sector, will also stimulate land transactions and thereby 
improve experience, transparency, and understanding of the market, all reducing transaction 
costs.    





Productivity and total welfare increase 
Imperfect competition and transaction costs t (for 
* t t ≠ ) create a wedge between the 




A pf pf ≠ .
36 Depending on the level of 
t, either the marginal value product of the IFs is larger than the marginal value product of the 
CFs or the marginal value product of the CFs is larger than the marginal value product of the 
IFs.
37 In any case a more efficient land allocation can be found where land productivity is 
higher.  
The removal of both market imperfections stimulates land transactions leading to a 
reallocation of land from farms with smaller marginal value products to farms with higher 
marginal value products, up to the point where the marginal value products are equalized. 
The reduction of transaction costs reduces IF rental costs and thus increases their land rental 




A pf pf > , IF can now offer a higher rent and outcompete CF and this leads to an increase 




A pf pf < , then 
more competition and less transaction costs will increase CF renting and reduce IF renting. 
Now CF can offer a higher rent than IF and therefore their land renting increases. The 
equilibrium after the reform is at the point where there are no more profitable land 




A pf pf = .
38  
How does this affect output and productivity? Land productivity before the reform is 
                                                 





A pf pf = . 
 
37 This follows from FOC with imperfect competition and transaction costs given by equations (4)  and (A7.1). 
 
38 For the special case when t=t
*  land reallocation will not take place because marginal products are equal 




A pf pf = , and no farm can offer a higher rate. The only effect will be an increase in 
land market rent.  
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= γ .  
The output effect is shown in figure 4.2 With transaction costs t2 (where t2>t
*) IF 
output gain is given by area MNOPQR while CF output loss is given by area OPQR. As a 
result, total output increases by area MN. With transaction costs t0 (where t0 < t
*) the total 
output increases by area FG  as CF output increases by area FGHJKL while IF output 
decreases by area HJKL.
40  
 
But there are important distributional effects 
The reform that simultaneously removes transaction costs and eliminates imperfect 
competition has significant income implications for the farms and landowners. Most 
obviously, reforms which eliminate CF market power reduces CF profits.
41 At the same time 
the removal of transaction costs increases land competition from IF leading to an increase in 
the market rent and further decreasing CF profits. This is illustrated in figure 4.2. The 
                                                 
39 This follows from the reverse of the proof shown in appendix A7 part b. 
 
40 With fixed land supply land productivity also increases. 
 
41 This follows from the proof shown in appendix A7 part b. Because CF gained from market imperfections, 





equilibrium before the reform is (At2
M, rt2
M) for transaction costs t2. The reform shifts the 
equilibrium to (A
*, r
*) and CF pay a higher rent (r
*>rt2
M) and rent less land (A
* < At2
M). Their 
profits are reduced by area DEGHJKOPQ.  
Both the removal of transaction costs and the elimination of imperfect competition 
increase market rent. As a result, landowners gain from the reform.
 42 The rent, as shown in 
figure 4.2 for transaction costs t2, increases from rt2
M to r
*. The landowners gains are equal to 
area DEGHJKOPQNUVY. 
The effect of the reform on IF depends on the size of initial transaction costs.
43 First, 
consider the case when initial transaction costs equal t2, where t2>t
* (figure 4.2). Reforms 
which reduce transaction costs t2 to zero and impose perfect competition create gains to IF. 
Without transaction costs the IF rental costs decrease. They can offer higher rent and rent 
more land. On the other hand, competition decreases IF land renting and increases the rent, 
because with the elimination of imperfect competition CF no longer push down land rent to 
maximize profits. The transaction costs effect is stronger than the market imperfection effect. 




M), and their rental costs 
decrease (r
* < rt2
M+t2) leading to net gains for IF equal to area MS. 
However, if initial transaction costs are lower then t
*, such as with t0 in figure 4.2 
where t0 < t
*, IF lose with reforms. The equilibrium with imperfect competition and 
transaction costs t0 is (At0
M, rt0
M).  Now after the reform the first effect (the transaction costs 
effect) is smaller than the second effect (the market imperfection effect). In equilibrium IF 




M) and the IF rental costs rise (r
*>rt0
M+t0). As a result, 
IF lose area HONU.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
42 This follows from the proof shown in appendix A7 part b. Because landowners lost from market 
imperfections, then they must gain from removing them. 
 
43 This follows from the proof shown in appendix A7 part b. If IF lost from market imperfections, then they 






4.5. The Effect of Partial Reform (Reduction of Transaction Costs but 
Imperfect Competition) 
 
In reality, transaction costs seem to be falling in many countries. In contrast, large corporate 
farms persist and continue to dominate the land market (table 1.1). In fact, in several 
countries a re-concentration has occurred recently.  For example in Russia and Kazakhstan 
huge farming companies, often using more than 100,000 hectares of land have emerged since 
1998 (Swinnen, 2005). The welfare and output effects can be quite different in this situation 
compared to the reform effects analyzed in the previous section. 
 
Productivity and welfare may increase or may decrease with partial reform 
The output and welfare effect of partial reform depend on the size of initial transaction costs. 
To show this, assume first that initial transaction costs are smaller than t
*. To earn monopoly 
profits, CF push the land market rent down by reducing renting. This shifts the renting 
equilibrium to (A
M, r
M) (figure 4.1). In equilibrium CF rent less land than the socially optimal 
level. However, transaction costs increase CF renting. Transaction costs smaller than or equal 
to t
* shift the CF renting closer to (A
*, r
*). In the special case when transaction costs are equal 
to t
* then the equilibrium is (At*
M, rt*
M), where A
* = A t*
M.
 
In this case, a reform which reduces transaction costs but which keeps imperfect 
competition unchanged moves the land allocation equilibrium away from the efficient land 
allocation, (A
*, r
*). IF can rent more land with reduced transaction costs because their rental 
costs decline with the reform. However, CF still affect the land market rent. They adjust their 
renting: to earn monopoly profits they decrease renting because of stronger competition from 
IF. Marginally more productive CF use less land. For example, with the reduction of 
transaction costs from t
* to zero the equilibrium shifts from the pre-reform equilibrium (At*












* (figure 4.1). Hence, with 
partial reform a new less efficient land allocation is achieved.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates the effects. CF production declines by area BEFJL. IF use more 
land so their production increases by area FJL. The total production effect is output loss equal 
to area BE.
44 Area BE is actually a monopoly loss caused by a distortion of the monopolistic 
behavior of CF with transaction costs zero. This monopoly loss is the maximum possible 
output loss of restructuring. On the other hand, because transaction costs are reduced to zero, 
positive welfare gains are realized equal to area GK.  The transaction costs gains, area GK, 
plus the output loss, area BE, implies that the direction of change of total welfare could be 
negative or positive depending on which area is larger. (This result is formally derived in 
appendix A8 part a). 
Now consider the alternative case that initial transaction costs t2 are larger than t
* (t2 > 
t
*). The equilibrium with t2 and imperfect competition is given by (At2
M, rt2
M). This is shown 
in figure 4.3. The reform that reduces transaction costs by Δt = │t
* - t2│ or by a smaller 
amount but keeps imperfect competition shifts the land allocation equilibrium closer to the 
competitive land allocation equilibrium (A
*), and the restructuring will be accompanied with 
output increase. For example, the reduction of transaction costs t2 to t1 (t
* < t1 < t2) shifts the 
equilibrium to (At1
M, rt1
M). The restructuring results in reallocation of land from less to more 
efficient users. The CF renting declines while renting of IF increases. CF produce less by area 
FGH, and IF produce more by area DEFGH. The total production effect is output gain equal 
to area DE. Because of the reduction of transaction costs there is a welfare gain equal to area 
KL. However, IF use more land by At2
M – At1
M. For this land transaction costs are incurred 
because the land must be withdrawn from the CF. These losses equal area EF. Hence, the 
                                                 





total net welfare effect is equal to the output effect (gain in area DE) plus the transaction 
costs effect (gain in area KL minus loss in area EF), i.e. area DKL – F.  
With further reduction of transaction costs (for Δt >│  t
* – t2│), the effect on 
productivity is ambiguous. The land allocation equilibrium moves beyond the competitive 
land allocation equilibrium (A
*). Consider the case when transaction costs t2 are reduced to 
zero. This is shown in figure 4.5. The total output effect can be split in two parts. First, the 
reduction of transaction costs to t
* results in output gains equal to area C. Second, for the 
reduction of transaction costs from t
* to zero ( Δt = │0 - t
*│) the output effect is negative and 
is equivalent to area B in figure 4.5 (which is equal to area BE in figure 4.1). 
The combined output effect of transaction costs reduction from t2 to zero, is output 
change equal to area C – B (figure 4.5). The sign of the net total output effect depends on the 
magnitudes of the two areas
45 (see appendix A8 part a for a formal derivation). 
The total welfare effect is equal to the output effect (area C – B) plus the transaction 
costs gains (area DK) (figure 4.5). The net effect on welfare with partial reform can be 
positive or negative (see also appendix A8 part a). 
In summary, we have shown that the effect of partial reform can lead to welfare gains 
or losses. The later may result because removing one imperfection while keeping the other 
one may cause an inefficient allocation of resources. Removing transaction costs increases 
total welfare. However, if the market power of CF is maintained, this leads to a misallocation 
of land resources and the total effect of reform may result in lower welfare and land 
productivity. 
 
CF lose, while IF and landowners gain from partial reform 





important income distributional effects. Beneficiaries are IF and landowners, while CF lose 
(see proof in appendix A7 part a). The removal of transaction costs benefit IF. Their rental 
costs decline and they can compete for more land. In equilibrium their renting increases and 
the rental costs that they pay decline. Consider transaction costs t2 in figure 4.5. With the 








t2 + t2) and they rent more land (A
T – A
M > A
T – A t2
M) Their profits increase by area 
CDEF.  
CF lose from the partial reform. With the reduction of transaction costs, land 
withdrawal is cheaper for IF. In equilibrium CF renting is lower and the rent they pay is 
higher. In the case shown in figure 4.5 after the reform the CF rent increases from rt2
M to r
M, 
while CF renting declines from A t2
M to A
M. CF losses equal area BEFGHJ.  
Landowners gain. Stronger competition between IF and CF due to reduced transaction 
costs pushes the market rent up. The rent increases from rt2
M to r
M and the landowners’ gains 
equal area GHJK. 
                                                                                                                                                        






4.6. Factors Affecting the Impacts: Land Demand Elasticities and 
Relative Farm Productivity 
 
As shown above, with partial reform, the reduction of transaction costs may increase 
output (such as area DE in figure 4.4 for the reduction of transaction costs from t2 to t
*), while 
other reductions in transaction costs may reduce output (such as area BE in figure 4.1 for the 
reduction of transaction costs from t
* to 0). The total welfare change is crucially dependent on 
the sizes of these output effects, because the total welfare change additionally to gains 
obtained from transaction costs reduction also depends on the output change.  
As discussed above, one important factor that affects the size of these output effects is 
the level of transaction costs. Two other relevant factors are land demand elasticities and 
relative farm productivity. 
 
Land Demand Elasticities 
Land demand elasticity measures the size of the adjustment in farms’ land rental demand 
when land rent changes. If CF land demand elasticity is high any land rent adjustment 
induces large changes in CF land renting, while if CF land elasticity is small any land rent 
adjustment induces small changes in CF land renting. In other words, with small land demand 
elasticity the CF land marginal product value (or the rent that CF is willing offer to 
landowners) changes greatly with respect to a change in land renting. The reverse holds for 
high elasticity.  
When the CF has market power it adjust land renting to equalize its land marginal 
value product with marginal costs (equation (6)) and not with the market rent as in the case of 
perfect competition (equation (A7.14)). With high (low) CF elasticity the land adjustment 





This implies high land allocation distortions with high CF land demand elasticity and small 
land allocation distortions with small CF land demand elasticity. As shown in figure 4.1 the 
partial reform that removes transaction costs t





M). The land allocation distortions that arises because of CF market power is, equal to A
* – 
A
M and increases with CF land demand elasticity. This implies that the output loss of the 
partial reform, given by area BE, also increases with the CF elasticity.
46 Similarly, when there 
is an output gain (such as area DE in figure 4.4 for the reduction of transaction costs from t2 
to t
*) with partial reform, everything else equal, the higher the CF elasticity, the higher the 
output gain.
47  
The IF land demand elasticity also affects the outcomes. The potential output loss that 
a partial reform can induce decreases with the IF elasticity. If partial reform reduces 
transaction costs t
* to zero but keeps imperfect competition, the land allocation equilibrium 
shifts from A
* to A
M (figure 4.1). The smaller the IF elasticity is, the higher land allocation 
distortion are, and A
M is moved further away from A
*. This implies a higher output loss as 
                                                 
46 Assume land demands of IF and CF to be linear (this demands will be used in the simulation model, see 
further): 
(38)  
I cA b t r + = +  
(39) 
C fA d r + =  
where c, f  <0. Then the output loss of the partial reform, given by area BE in figure 4.1 is as follows:  
(40)   Area BE
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c f c f
cA d b c f c
T
. 
From equation (40) it can be shown that output loss of the partial reform, given by area BE in figure 4.1, 
increases with CF demand elasticity (




η , and decreases with IF demand elasticity 
(






47 From equations (38) and (39) the output gain of the partial reform, given by area DE in figure 4.4 can be 
calculated as follows:  
(41)   Area DE
2
) )( 2 (
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c f c f
cA d b c c f t f c
T
. 
From equation (40) it can be shown that output gain of the partial reform, given by area DE in figure 4.4, 





given by area BE. Similarly, (potential) output gains of partial reform increase with the IF 
elasticity. For example if transaction costs t2 are reduced to t
* the land allocation with partial 
reform shifts from At2
M to A
* (figure 4.4). Land allocation distortions decrease with IF 
elasticity. This implies that with high IF elasticity the land allocation equilibrium with 
imperfect competition and t2, At2
M, is closer to the equilibrium with perfect competition and 
t2, At2
*, but further away from the equilibrium without market imperfections A
*. This implies 
that the output gain given by area DE increases with IF elasticity.   
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate the impact of elasticities on output changes with reforms 
based on simulation results.
48 Figure 4.6 shows the output loss (such as given by area BE in 
figure 4.1 with the reduction of t
* to 0 with partial reform) for different IF and CF land 
demand elasticities. Everything else equal, the output losses increase with the CF land 
demand elasticity and decreases with the IF land demand elasticity. Figure 4.7 shows 
simulation results for output gains with partial reform (such as given by area DE in figure 4.4 
for the reduction of transaction costs from t2 to t
*). The output gains are larger with larger CF 
and IF elasticities. 
  In summary, it is more likely that partial reform leads to net output loss and hence to 
total welfare loss when the IF elasticity is small. CF market power causes larger land 
allocation distortions with smaller IF demand elasticity. Hence, the output loss which can 
arise from partial reform increases, while the output gain decreases with smaller IF elasticity.  
In the case of CF elasticity, the pattern in total output change and total welfare change is not 
clear, because both output loss and output gain that can arise from a partial reform move in 
the same direction with the CF land demand elasticity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        





Relative Farm Productivity  
Another factor that affects the outcome is the relative productivity of the farms. This is shown 
in figure 4.8. Assume initial CF demand as given by D1
C. The equilibrium with transaction 
costs t and imperfect competition is (A1t
M, r1t
M). If CF productivity increases, its land demand 
shifts upwards.
49 The CF demand shifts from D1
C to D2
C and the equilibrium shifts to (A2t
M, 
r2t
M). CF rent more land in equilibrium, A2t
M > A1t
M. With low CF productivity the reform 




M), while with higher CF land productivity 




M). Distortions in land allocation 




M. The reform then 
induces higher output loss the more productive CF are.
 50  In figure 4.8 this output loss is 
given by areas B1 and B2, respectively for low and high CF relative productivity. It is clear 
that where area B2 is larger than area B1. 
                                                                                                                                                        
48 The simulations are not based on real data from a transition country. The CF and IF land demands are 
assumed to be linear. Total agricultural land is assumed to be equal to 100 hectares and transaction costs are 
assumed to be constant ( 0 = ∂ ∂
I A t ). 
49 Higher CF productivity implies that CF can produce more from the same input. Total production increases for 
any amount of land they rent.  This implies that for any area they rent, say A
T  ( ) ( )
T C T C A pf A pf 1 2 > , where 
C f2  represents production function with higher productivity as compared to production function 
C f1 . Define 
relative farm productivity as the ratio of CF and IF land productivity with A













Every thing else equal, the CF productivity relative to IF is higher with  ( )
T C A pf2  than with ( )












A pf 1 2 > . 
 
50 In monopsony, CF equalize the land marginal value product with marginal cost as given by equation (6). With 
perfect competition the optimal CF renting decision is were land marginal product value is equal to land market 
rent given by equation (A7.14).  With higher CF productivity CF renting, 
M A , increases. This implies that the 
second term on the right hand side of equation (6) also increases with CF productivity. Compared to perfect 
competition equilibrium, then with market power CF must decrease more land renting with high productivity 















This implies that land distortions increase with CF land productivity. 





Inversely, similar logic applies to output gain as given by the areas C in figure 4.8. 
The output gain is lower with higher CF productivity. This output gain occurs if initial 
transaction costs t, larger than t
* (t>t
*), are reduced to t
*. With higher CF productivity the land 
allocation distortions are smaller and hence smaller output gains are obtained from the reform 
which reduces the transaction costs t to t
*. 
There are also gains in reduced transaction costs. These gains decrease with CF 
productivity. With low relative CF productivity, transaction costs gains equal area EF, while 
with higher CF efficiency, transaction costs gains equal area DF, where area EF > area DF.  
Figure 4.9 summarizes simulations results for these effects. The horizontal axis shows 
relative CF productivity. The vertical axis shows the three effects as graphically shown in 
figure 4.8 (area B, area C and transaction costs gains as shown in figure 4.8) and the net 
welfare effect (net welfare = area C + transaction costs gains - area B). All results are 
represented as the share of total production. For high CF relative productivity welfare losses 
tend to dominate, while for low CF productivity welfare gains tend to dominate.
51   
In summary, it is more likely that partial reform will cause net output loss and hence 
net welfare loss the higher CF land productivity is relative to IF. This is because land 
allocation distortions are more likely to increase after the partial reform the higher CF relative 
land productivity is. 
                                                 
51 In reality one may expect that CF productivity relative to IF is not so high. There is large literature arguing 
that large CF are inefficient relative to IF due to labour monitoring problem (e.g. Pollak, 1985; Schmitt, 1991). 








This chapter used a model with transaction costs and imperfect competition in the 
land market to analyze the efficiency and welfare effects of reforms which reduce transaction 
costs as large farms continue to dominate the land market. The implications are important. 
The results show that the continuation of imperfect competition mitigates efficiency gains 
and welfare benefits that would otherwise result from reforms that reduce transaction costs. 
In extreme cases, partial reforms can actually lead to welfare losses. Removing one 
imperfection while keeping the other one may cause an inefficient allocation of resources. 
When removing transaction costs, total welfare increases. However, if market power of CF is 
maintained, this leads to a misallocation of land resources and the total effect of reform may 
result in lower welfare and land productivity. These welfare effects are strongly affected by 
the size of transaction costs, relative farm productivity and farm land demand elasticities.  
Partial reforms also have important income distribution effects. IF gain because their 
rental costs decline due to a reduction in transaction costs. CF lose because of higher rents 
and stronger competition from IF. Higher land market rents lead to gains to landowners.  
The early literature on collective action shows that wealth inequality may be required 
to create incentives for the provision of common goods (reforms) (Olson, 1965). Based on 
this argument, the literature on collective action implies lower incentives for reforms in 
transition countries. Imperfect competition and transaction costs may cause positive or 
negative externalities depending on whether they concern CF, IF or landowners. Landowners 
loose from both types of market imperfections. In many transition countries landownership is 
fragmented. Based on this early literature on collective action and land inequality, the 





costs and imperfect competition is limited. This is because in the case of fragmented 
landownership gains to an individual landowner are small compared to the costs of such an 
action. On the other hand, CF gain from both types of market imperfections. CF have higher 
incentives to act resulting in the same or higher market imperfections because large CF gain a 
significant proportion of the total benefit from the reforms. IF gain from imperfect 
competition, while they loose from transaction costs. Similar to landowners, their incentives 
to cooperate in a collective action are small. However, the recent literature has stressed 
negative impact of increased wealth inequality on the provision of common goods (e.g. 
Baland and Platteau, 1997; La Ferrara, 2002; Bardhan, Ghatak, and Karaivanov, 2007; Olper, 
2007). Additionally, political economy factors may affect the equilibrium level of reforms 
(e.g. Pecorino 1998; Swinnen, 1999; Magee, 2002; Dutt and Mitra, 2005; Olper, 2007). These 
factors complicate predictions of reform implementation in transition countries. 







A1. Proof of Proposition 1.   















 without transaction costs and perfect 
competition. In this case, total profits of IF, CF and landowners, respectively, are 
()
I I I I A s r A pf − − = ∏ ) ( ,  ( )
C C C C A s r A pf − − = ∏ ) ( , and 
T L rA = ∏ . 
Then we must show that: 
































































(A1.4)  s r pf
I
A − =     First  order  condition  of a representative IF 
(A1.5)  s r pf
C
A − =       CF' first order condition 
(A1.6) 
C I T A A A + =     Land  equilibrium  condition 
Totally differentiating equations (A1.4 – A1.6) yields: 
(A1.7)  ds dr dA pf
I I
AA − =  
(A1.8)  ds dr dA pf
C C





(A1.9) 0 = +
C I dA dA  
Using (A1.7 – A1.9), it follows that: 

















Q.E.D of part 1. 















 with transaction costs and imperfect 
competition. Now the total profit of IF is defined by equation  ()
I I I I A s t r A pf − + − = ∏ ) (.  
For CF and landowners total profits are defined as in part 1. Then we must show that: 





































as well as (A1.3). 
Where t(A


















With imperfect competition and transaction costs, the conditions (A1.6) must be satisfied, as 
well as: 
(A1.13)  s t r pf
I






A s r pf
∂
∂
+ − =   CF' first order condition 





 can be obtained: 
(A1.15)  A
I



































) yields (A1.9), as well as: 
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AA − = − + − +  
Using (A1.9), (A1.16) and (A1.17), it follows that: 
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A2. Proof of Proposition 2 















, if  s s
I α = and  1 0 < <α .  
 
A2.1. Perfect competition and no transaction costs 
In equilibrium the conditions (A1.5) and (A1.6) must be satisfied, as well as: 
(A2.1.1)  s r pf
I
A α − =  
Totally differentiating equations (A1.5), (A1.6) and (A2.1.1) yields (A1.8) and (A1.9) as well 
as: 
(A2.1.2)  ds dr dA pf
I I
AA α − =  















The denominator is negative with  0 <
C
AA f  and  0 <
I
























































































Landowners and CF gain while IF lose with unequal subsidies.  
Q.E.D.  
 
A2.2. Imperfect competition and transaction costs 
Now conditions (A1.6) and (A1.14) must be satisfied, as well as: 
(A2.2.1)  s A t r pf
I I
A α − + = ) (    
Totally differentiating equations (A1.6), (A1.14) and (A2.2.1) and using equation (A1.15) 
yields (A1.9) and (A1.17), as well as: 
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t A pf A t pf pf
t A pf A pf t pf
ds
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The necessary condition for a maximum for the CF profit function is that its second 

















AA t A pf A t pf pf  
This implies that the denominators in equations (A2.2.3) and (A2.2.4) as well as the 
numerator in (A2.2.4) are positive. Hence, unequal subsidies lead to a decrease of land used 
by individual farmers and to an increase of the land rent.  
Calculating the effect of unequal subsidies on profits, yields: 
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t A pf A t pf pf
t A pf A pf pf t A
ds




A3. Proof of Proposition 6 
To show:   1 >
ds
dr
 with  0 > α . 
We show the case when farms remain credit constrained with the subsidy.
52  
With area payments the farm credit constraint is given by (36). In equilibrium condition (29) 
must be satisfied, as well as: 
(A3.1)  () 0 1 = − + − + s r
k
s
pf pf K A α
α
 
Totally differentiating (29) and (A3.1) yields: 
                                                 
52 The case when area subsidies remove the full credit constraint can be analogously derived.  





(A3.2)  0 = − + dr Rds MdA  
(A3.3)  0 = dA  
where  
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=  and (b) that  0 > − k pfK . If farms are credit constrained, when using 
additional fertilizer land marginal profitability must increase,  0 > Π AK , which implies that 
0 > + = Π
k
s
pf pf KK AK AK
α
. If this is not the case, then by decreasing fertilizer marginal 
profitability of land increases which increases farms’ profits. However, this would imply that 





< . Hence 
with 0 > − k pfK  and with  0 > + = Π
k
s
pf pf KK AK AK
α
, it follows that: 















A4. Proof of Proposition 7 and 8 
Part a: 




 with  0 > α . 
We show the case when farms remain credit constrained with the subsidy.
53  
Farm profits are:  () kK A s r K A pf − − − = ∏ ) , ( . It follows that: 



















With  0 > +
k
s
pf pf KK AK
α




 if  0 > α . If  0 = α  





Q.E.D part a. 
Part b: 
To show:    0 >
ds
dW
 with  0 > α . 
We consider the situation where the credit constrained farms remain credit constrained with 
the subsidy.
54 
Total welfare (W) is the sum of farm profits (Π ), landowners total rents (
T L rA = Π ), and 
minus taxpayers costs 
T sA , i.e. 

















                                                 
53 The case when area subsidies remove all credit constraints can be analogously derived. 
 
54 The case when area subsidies remove all credit constraints can be analogously derived.  






































A5. Proof of Proposition 9 
We analyze the general case when both farms (farm 1 and farm 2) are and remain credit 
constrained (and  0
2 1 > =α α ).
55 












 or  0 >  if farm 2 is more credit constrained than farm 
1, (and vice versa). 
Profit of farm i is  ( )













+ − − =
∏ α
  
With area payments, farm i’s credit constraint is as follows: 
(A5.2) 
i i i i i sA W S kK α + ≤ ) (.  
In equilibrium the following condition must be satisfied: 



















Totally differentiating (A5.3) yields: 
                                                 
55 The case when area subsidies remove all credit constraints can be analogously derived. 





(A5.4)  0 = − + dr ds R dA M
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where 



























































i α α α
, 
Using (A5.4) it follows that: 
(A5.7)  1 2 1










A necessary condition for maximum profit is that  0 < Π
i
AA , implying that  0 <
i M . With 
credit constraints it holds that  0 > − k pf
i











α 56 implying 
that 1 ≥




The more farm i is credit constrained the less fertilizers it can use, implying (a) that 










+  when adding 
additional fertilizers, and (b) the higher is the difference between fertilizers marginal value 
product and fertilizers price,  k pf
i
K − . Hence, for a given  0 >
i α , 
i R  is higher the more farm 
i is credit constrained. 
Then it follows that for 
2 1 α α = : if 
1 2 R R >  (if farm 2 is more credit constrained than 












 or  0 > . 
Q.E.D. 
                                                 
56 The intuition is the same as shown in the proof of proposition 1 in Appendix A1. 






A6. Perfect Competition and Welfare Effect of Transaction Costs 



















L C I W ∏ + ∏ + ∏ = . 
In equilibrium with perfect competition and transaction costs conditions (4) and (15) must be 
satisfied as well as: 
(A6.1) 
C I T A A A + =   
Totally differentiating equations (4), (15) and (A6.1) yields: 
(A6.2)  dt dr dA pf
I I
AA + =  
(A6.3)  dr dA pf
C C
AA =  
(A6.4) 0 = +





































IF renting and land market rent decline with transaction costs. 
Totally differentiating equations (3), 
C C C C rA A pf − = ∏ ) ( , and 
T L rA = ∏ and using 
equations (4), (15) and (A.5.6) yields: 


























































































IF and landowners lose while CF gains. Total welfare effect is negative. 
Q.E.D. 
 
A7. Imperfect Competition and Welfare Effect of Transaction Costs 
Part a: this part shows the effect of transaction costs on welfare and profit when there is 
imperfect competition. 



















In equilibrium with imperfect competition and with transaction costs condition (4) and (A6.1) 
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Define transaction costs t








A f f = ), hence from (4), 













* (which is the cost that IF pay above r) exactly matches the murk-up of CF, i.e. t
* 
exactly matches the amount by which CF land marginal value product exceeds the 

















) yields (A6.2) and (A6.4), as well as: 
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pf A pf pf
pf A pf pf
dt
dr  
The necessary condition for a maximum for the CF profit function is that its second 















AA pf A pf pf  
IF renting and market rent decreases with the increase of transaction costs. 
Totally differentiating equations (3), 
C C C C rA A pf − = ∏ ) ( , and 
T L rA = ∏ and using 
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IF and landowners lose, while CF gain if transaction costs increase. 
Next solving for 
dt
dW



























Total welfare effect is ambiguous with imperfect competition. The first term on the right 










pf A pf pf
pf A
− + 2
, is positive. The second one, 




C pf A  is the amount by which CF land marginal value exceeds in equilibrium 
the land market rent r (see (A7.1) and (A7.2)). With perfect competition, land marginal value 




− = , 
which is the same as given by equation (A6.10) for the perfect competition case. 
Q.E.D. part a. 
 
Part b: this section compares profits and total welfare obtained with imperfect competition 
and transaction costs, relative to profits and total welfare obtained with perfect competition 
and zero transaction costs. 
To show:  
*
0 0 = > <
t
M
t W W ; 
*
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In equilibrium with perfect competition and zero transaction costs condition (A6.1) must be 
satisfied as well as: 
(A7.13)  r pf
I
A =  
(A7.14)  r pf
C
A =  










From equation (A7.3), from imperfect competition and transaction costs equilibrium 
conditions (4), (A7.1), (A6.1), and from perfect competition and zero transaction costs 
equilibrium conditions (A7.13), (A7.14), and (A6.1) it follows that:  
I.  For  t such that t = t








t =  and  
* A A A A
T M
t
T − = − , hence 
*
0




T Q p pQ , where 
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* =  is total output with imperfect competition and 




T Q  is total output with perfect competition and zero 












A pf pf ≠  leading to output fall. 
II.  For any t such that 0 < t < t
* (t > t
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* A A
M
t < , 
* A A A A
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t > , 
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T M
t
T − < − ), hence 
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0 0




T Q p Q p . Land allocation 
equilibrium with higher total output can be found. 
III.  Total transaction costs for t equal to ( )t A A
M
t
T − .  
From I, II, and III it follows that for any t, total welfare with imperfect competition and 
transaction costs is lower relative to total welfare with perfect competition and zero 
transaction costs, 
*
0 0 = > <
t
M




0 = = =
t
T






t − − =
> > 0 0 . 
 
CF gain with imperfect competition and transaction costs relative to the perfect competition 





First, imperfect competitive behavior of CF implies 
*




C  otherwise behaving as a 
dominant player in the land market is not an optimal choice for CF. Second, with imperfect 





; this follows from 
equation (A7.9), hence 
*






C .  
In equilibrium with imperfect competition and transaction costs, CF gain relative to the 
perfect competition and zero transaction costs equilibrium.  
 
IF gains/losses 
From equation (A7.3), from imperfect competition equilibrium and transaction costs 
conditions (4), (A7.1), (A6.1), and from perfect competition and zero transaction costs 
equilibrium conditions (A7.13), (A7.14), and (A6.1) it follows that:  
IV.  For any t such that 
* 0 t t ≤ <  it follows that in equilibrium with imperfect competition, 
*
0 0







A pf f p  implying, 
* A A A A
T M
t
T − ≥ −  hence 
* r t r
M
t ≤ + , yielding 
*
0 0




I . With imperfect competition and transaction costs t, such that 
* 0 t t ≤ <  IF gain relative to the perfect competition and zero transaction costs 
equilibrium, because they have lower rental costs and rent more land. 
V.  For any t such that 
* t t >  it follows that in equilibrium with imperfect competition, 
*
0







A f p pf  implying 
* A A A A
T M
t
T − < − , hence 
* r t r
M
t > + , yielding 
*
0




I . With imperfect competition and transaction costs t, such that t > t
* IF 
lose relative to the perfect competition and zero transaction costs equilibrium because 






Landowners lose with imperfect competition and transaction costs relative to the perfect 
competition and zero transaction costs equilibrium: 
From imperfect competition equilibrium and transaction costs conditions (4)nditions (4), 
(A7.1), (A6.1), and from perfect competition and zero transaction costs equilibrium 
conditions (A7.13), (A7.14), and (A6.1) it follows that 
* r r
M
t < , hence 
*










L A r = Π







Q.E.D. part b. 
 
A8. Welfare and Land Productivity with Partial Reform 












t t 0 * = > <> γ γ  
 
Part a: 




The total welfare effect is ambiguous. 
From equations  ( )
I I I I A t r A pf + − = ∏ ) ( ,  
C C C C rA A pf − = ∏ ) ( , 
T L rA = ∏ , 
L C I W ∏ + ∏ + ∏ =  it follows: 
(A8.1) 
I T I C C I I tA pQ tA A pf A pf W − = − + = ) ( ) (  
When transaction costs are altered, total welfare is affected through 1) change in total output 
value (
T pQ ) and 2) through the change in the level transaction costs incurred (
I tA ). 
Totally differentiating 


















− =  
From equation (A7.5) and from I and II in appendix A6 part b, it follows that for any t such 
that 








A pf pf ≤ , respectively, hence  

























0 * 0 = ≤ < >  
The partial reform that eliminates only transaction costs (for 
* 0 t t ≤ < ) causes total output 
decline. 
Equation (A8.4) implies that the effect of the removal of transaction costs t, such that 
* 0 t t ≤ < , on welfare is ambiguous: 
(A8.5)  0










T tA pQ pQ < −
= ≤ < 0 * 0  
(A8.6)  0










T tA pQ pQ > −
= ≤ < 0 * 0  
The term 
I tA  (given by area GK in figure 4.1 for transaction costs t
*) represents transaction 






0 * 0 = ≤ < −  (given by area BE in figure 4.1 for transaction 
costs t
*) represents output loss resulted from the removal of transaction costs. 
From equation (A7.5) and from II in appendix A6 part b, it follows that for any t such that 








A pf pf > , respectively, hence  





























* * = > <  
The partial reform that elimination transaction costs t (for 
* t t > ) to t
* increases total output. 
From equation (A8.8) and from equations (A8.4) - (A8.6) it implies that the effect of the 
removal of transaction costs t (for 
* t t > ) on welfare is ambiguous: 
(A8.9)  0














T pQ pQ tA pQ pQ
* * 0 * > = = = − + < −  
(A8.10)  0














T pQ pQ tA pQ pQ
* * 0 * > = = = − + > −  
The term 
I tA  (given by area DK in figure 4.5 for transaction costs t2) represents transaction 






* * > = −  (given by area C in figure 4.5 for transaction costs 
t2) represents output gain caused by the reduction of transaction costs from t to t







0 * = = −  (given by area B in figure 4.5 for transaction costs t2) represents 
output loss caused by the reduction of transaction costs from t
* to t = 0 
Q.E.D. part a. 
 
Part b: 
From equation (A8.4), it follows that for any t such that 























≤ < = > = γ γ  
Land productivity is larger with positive transaction costs, such that 
* 0 t t ≤ < , than with zero 
transaction costs. 
From equation (A8.4) and (A8.8), it follows that for any t such that 
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* *  is land productivity gain caused by the reduction of 
transaction costs from t to t

























* 0  
represents land productivity loss caused by the reduction of transaction costs from t
* to t =0. 
The land productivity may increase or may decreases with the removal of transaction costs t, 
for 
* t t > . 
Q.E.D. part b. 





Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.1. Farm structures in transition countries 
  Individual farms  Corporate farms 










Albania*  96    4    1998 
Bulgaria  44  1  55  861  1997 
Czech Republic  28  20  72  937  2003 
Hungary  59  4  41  312  2000 
Poland  87  8  13    2003 
Romania  55  2  45  274  2002 
Slovakia  12  42  88  1185  2003 
Slovenia  94    6    2000 
CEECs   59    41     
Estonia  63  2  37  327  2001 
Latvia  90  12  10  297  2001 
Lithuania  89  4  11  483  2003 
Baltic States   81    19     
Armenia  100  1      1999 
Azerbaijan  9    91    1997 
Belarus  12  1  88  3 130  2000 
Georgia  66  1  34  100  2000 
Kazakhstan  29  15  71  11 248  2000 
Kyrgyzstan   23    77    1997 
Moldavia  49    51    2003 
Russia  14    86  5 400  2000 
Tajikistan  7    93    1997 
Turkmenistan  0.3    99.7    1997 
Uzbekistan  4    96    1997 
Ukraine  41    59    2004 
CIS   30    77     
Sources: Bulgaria: Bulgarian Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; Czech Republic: Czech Statistical Office; 
Estonia: Statistical Office of Estonia; Hungary: European Commission; Poland: Central Statistical Office; 
Latvia: Statistical Office of Latvia; Lithuania: Statistical Office of Lithuania; Slovenia: Statistical Office of the 
Republic of Slovenia;  Moldova: Lerman and Sutton (2006); Russia: Koester (2003); Ukraine: Lerman and 
Sedik . 2007; Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan: FAO (2002); Azerbaijan,  Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan: Lerman, Csaki, and Feder (2002); Albania: Albanian Ministry of Agriculture; 
Slovakia: Ministry of Agriculture; Romania: Romanian National Institute of Statistics. 
 
Notes: 
TAA – Total Agricultural Area 







Table 1.2. Land rents in the Czech Republic and Slovakia  
(the value of rents are in local currencies) 






       
Czech Republic       
Average 1999  718  346  208 
by region       
   Corn growing region  1330  597  223 
   Sugar beet growing region  846  731  116 
   Potato growing region  447  174  257 
   Potato-oats growing region  761  158  482 
   Mountain growing region  205  68  301 
Average 2003  875  660  133 
Average 2004  944  759  124 
       
Slovakia       
2001  795  242  329 
2002  816  333  245 
2003  732  393  186 
2004  845  498  170 
2005  923  638  145 
Source: Czech Ministry of Agriculture; Research Institute of Agricultural Economics. 





Table 3.1. Simulation results  
  Surplus change as a share of subsidy expenditure 
[X/(s*A
T)] (%) 














Landowners   Consumers  Welfare 
gain 
1 0.5  0.1 ∞  0  -∞   -12  0  178  0  67 
                      
2 0.5  0.1 1.5  0  -∞   -53  20  173  0  40 
3 0.5  0.1 0.5  0  -∞   -81  33  170  0  22 
4 0.5  0.1 ∞  0 -0.7    -160  0  161  165 66 
5 0.5  0.1 ∞  0 -0.3    -355  0  138  381 65 
6 0.5  0.1 ∞  0.1  -∞   1  0  163  0  66 
7 0.5  0.1 ∞  0.2  -∞   13  0  151  0  65 
8 0  0.1  ∞  0  -∞   0  0  100  0  0 
9 0.75  0.1  ∞  0  -∞   -18  0  217  0  100 
10 0.50  0.2  ∞  0  -∞   -24  0  190  0  67 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
Table 3.2. Farm household surplus change (as share of subsidy expenditures) under 
different assumptions of household land ownership  
  Change in farm household surplus with 










elasticity   25%  50%  75% 
1 0.5 0.1  ∞  0  -∞   32  77  121 
                 
2 0.5 0.1  1.5  0  -∞   -10  33  77 
3 0.5 0.1  0.5  0  -∞   -39  4  46 
4 0.5 0.1  ∞  0 -0.7    -120  -80  -40 
5 0.5 0.1  ∞  0 -0.3    -320  -286  -251 
6 0.5 0.1  ∞  0.1  -∞   42  83  124 
7 0.5 0.1  ∞  0.2  -∞   51  88  126 
8 0 0.1  ∞  0  -∞   25  50  75 
9 0.75 0.1  ∞  0  -∞   36  90  145 
10 0.50 0.2  ∞  0  -∞   23  71  118 
Source: own calculations 
 

































































































































































































Figure 2.1. Effect of subsidies without imperfect competition and transaction costs in 































































































































































Figure 2.3. Effect of unequal subsidies (without imperfect competition and transaction 























































































Figure 2.4. Effect of unequal subsidies with imperfect competition and transaction costs 









































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.3. Equilibria in the land market with credit constraints, with area payments, 
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Figure 4.1. Effect of transaction costs t
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Figure 4.3. Effect of transaction costs reduction on output and welfare with imperfect 
























































































Figure 4.4. Effect of transaction costs reduction on output and welfare with imperfect 






























































































Figure 4.5. Effect of transaction costs elimination on output and welfare with imperfect 
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Figure 4.6. The effect of land demand elasticities on output loss (shown in % change of 
total output) induced by the reduction of initial transaction costs t
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Figure 4.7. The effect of land demand elasticities on output gain (shown in % change of 
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Figure 4.8. Relative farm productivity and total welfare effects of transaction costs 








































































































Figure 4.9. Relative farm productivity and the effect of the removal of transaction costs 
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